Can we trust trust explanations?An experimental illustration of how outcome based accounts of trust struggle to explain a basic phenomenon of human life by Mensching, Johannes Ole
 Can we trust trust explanations? 
An experimental illustration of how 
outcome based accounts of trust struggle 
to explain a basic phenomenon of human 
life 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation 
zur 
Erlangung des Doktorgrades 
der 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der 
Universität zu Köln 
 
 
2011 
vorgelegt 
von 
Diplom-Volkswirt Johannes Ole Mensching 
aus 
Bonn 
 
   
Referent: Prof. Dr. Detlef Fetchenhauer, Universität zu Köln 
Korreferent: Prof. Robb Willer, Ph. D., University of California, 
Berkeley, USA 
 
Tag der Promotion: 
08.07.2011
I 
Table of contents 
List of Figures ............................................................................... V 
List of Tables ............................................................................... VI 
1. Acknowledgments ......................................................... VII 
2. Introduction ..................................................................10 
2.1. Why trust is important ...............................................12 
2.2. Definition of trust ......................................................14 
2.3. Economic and rational choice accounts of trust .........17 
2.3.1. The roots of homo oeconomicus ........................................ 18 
2.3.2. The birth of homo oeconomicus ........................................ 20 
2.3.3. Conclusions of the homo oeconomicus concept for trust 
decisions........................................................................... 20 
2.4. How to measure trust towards strangers .....................21 
2.4.1. The trust game ................................................................. 22 
2.4.2. Measures of trust in the trust game ................................. 23 
2.4.3. Basic findings in the trust- and investment game ............ 24 
2.5. Scientific integration of this work ..............................25 
3. Overview of current research .........................................27 
4. Why do people trust? .....................................................30 
4.1. Introduction ...............................................................30 
II 
4.1.1. Potential Explanations for Trust Behavior ........................ 32 
4.1.2. Testing Explanations for Trust Behavior .......................... 36 
4.2. Methods .....................................................................39 
4.2.1. Decisions of trustees ........................................................ 39 
4.2.2. The lab experiment ........................................................... 40 
4.2.3. Payout for trustees ........................................................... 41 
4.3. Results .......................................................................42 
4.4. Discussion ..................................................................46 
5. Do people trust at any cost? ..........................................51 
5.1. Introduction ...............................................................51 
5.1.1. How to measure trust ....................................................... 52 
5.1.2. Trust Behavior .................................................................. 52 
5.1.3. Is trust strategic? .............................................................. 53 
5.2. Method .......................................................................56 
5.2.1. Participants ...................................................................... 56 
5.2.2. Procedure.......................................................................... 56 
5.3. Results .......................................................................59 
5.3.1. Number of Risky Decisions in Trust Games and Lotteries 59 
5.3.2. Trustworthiness estimations ............................................ 63 
5.3.3. Subjective beliefs of trustors and participants of lotteries 64 
5.4. Discussion ..................................................................65 
III 
6. More nosy than regret averse? – Can curiosity explain 
high risk tolerance in trust games? ................................68 
6.1. Introduction ...............................................................68 
6.1.1. Current Trust Research .................................................... 69 
6.1.2. The curiosity hypothesis................................................... 72 
6.1.3. The regret hypothesis ....................................................... 76 
6.2. Method .......................................................................78 
6.2.1. Participants ...................................................................... 78 
6.2.2. Procedure.......................................................................... 78 
6.3. Results .......................................................................81 
6.3.1. The influence of curiosity and regret on trust decisions ... 81 
6.3.2. Replication of Past Findings ............................................. 82 
6.4. Discussion ..................................................................85 
7. General discussion .........................................................90 
7.1. Summary of empirical results and integrative 
discussion ..................................................................90 
7.2. Conclusion .................................................................92 
8. Non-consequential accounts of trust ..............................94 
9. Further research ............................................................98 
9.1. Trust and individual differences .................................98 
9.2. Intercultural trust research ........................................98 
IV 
9.3. Trust and evolutionary psychology .............................99 
9.4. Trust, biology and neuroeconomics .......................... 101 
10. Further studies ............................................................ 103 
10.1. More nosy than regret averse – Five follow-up studies103 
10.1.1. Curious people trust while regret averse people distrust? 
Examination of individual differences ............................ 105 
10.1.2. Study 1 ........................................................................... 106 
10.1.3. Study 2 ........................................................................... 107 
10.1.4. Study 3 ........................................................................... 110 
10.1.5. Study 4 ........................................................................... 114 
10.1.6. Study 5 ........................................................................... 115 
10.2. Normative influences on trust .................................. 117 
10.2.1. What we can learn from a public trust game ................. 117 
10.2.2. The influence of descriptive and injunctive norms on 
trust decisions ................................................................ 119 
10.3. The flesh is willing, but the spirit is weak? ............... 122 
10.4. On the relationship of status and trust ..................... 132 
10.4.1. Do high-status people trust more than low-status 
people? ........................................................................... 133 
10.4.2. Does trusting enhance status? ....................................... 135 
11. References ................................................................... 137 
  
V 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Percentage of participants who chose the risky option in 
the trust game, the ordinary coin flip and the extended coin flip
 ................................................................................................ 42 
Figure 2: Estimations of trustworthiness of trustees in the trust 
game in comparison to the actual behavior of trustees ............. 43 
Figure 3: Subjective beliefs about the chance of doubling money in 
the trust game, the ordinary coin flip and the extended coin flip
 ................................................................................................ 44 
Figure 4: Percentages of risky choices in trust games and in the 
lotteries ................................................................................... 60 
Figure 5: Trustors' estimations of trustworthy trustees in the trust 
game in comparison to the actual behavior of trustees ............. 64 
Figure 6: Percentage of participants, who chose the risky option in 
the trust game and the ordinary coin flip, separated by condition
 ................................................................................................ 82 
Figure 7: Trustor’s estimations of trustworthiness of trustees in the 
trust game in comparison to the actual behavior of trustees, 
separated by condition ............................................................. 84 
 
 
 
 
 
  
VI 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Summary of binary-logistic regression with the trust game 
and k=1 as reference category .................................................. 61 
Table 2: Overview of significant differences of risky decisions in the 
trust game and lotteries ........................................................... 62 
 
 
  
VII 
1. Acknowledgments 
I would not have completed this dissertation without the 
supervision, knowledge, and help of the many people I want to 
recognize here. First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisor 
Professor Detlef Fetchenhauer. Instead of using empty phrases, I 
want to give an example of the kind of supervision he provided. He 
strongly urged me to apply for the scholarship I have been receiving 
from the German Ministry of Technology and Science during the 
duration of my work. It happened that the application for that 
scholarship was due three months before I started my Ph. D., and at 
the time, I was doing an internship at a big consultancy. Although 
Detlef Fetchenhauer strongly suggested that I should apply for that 
scholarship, I decided against applying because I was working 12 
hours a day and spent another 3 hours commuting. Noticing my 
reluctance, he kept trying to convince me on various occasions. 
Finally, I gave in because I had no more energy to object. I wrote my 
application in secrecy and during nights that were already too short. I 
did not expect to get accepted. Receiving the grant was not only very 
important for my entire Ph. D. effort but also one of the key moments 
of work on my dissertation. Detlef taught me how to push myself 
beyond assumed limits, and I grew in self-confidence. During my Ph. 
D., I always had the feeling that Detlef Fetchenhauer took on the 
costs of spending time and energy for the benefit of his students. 
Furthermore, I want to thank him for turning me into a researcher, 
all the knowledge he taught me, and being my supervisor. 
 I also thank Dr. Thomas Schlösser for his supervision, ideas, 
and mentoring during the course of my dissertation. He always 
reminded me to more thoroughly think about arguments, theories, 
and experimental designs. I thank him for the interesting 
conversations we had and his ideas for our corporate research. 
  
VIII 
 On a different note, I want to thank Professor Detlef 
Fetchenhauer, Professor Dave Dunning and Dr. Thomas Schlösser 
jointly. I stood on these giants’ shoulders to see a little bit farther and 
make my own small contribution to the world of science. The 
research for this thesis is based on their work, ideas, and insights.  
 My special thanks go to Professor Robb Willer, Ph. D. for many 
things. First, I want to thank him for inviting me to Berkeley, where I 
had one of the most interesting and pleasant times of my life. This 
research stay was not only important for me as a scientist but also 
for my personal development. I thank Robb Willer for welcoming me 
in Berkeley from the first to the last day of my stay. Furthermore, I 
am grateful for the extensive amount of time he spent with me to help 
me come up with original research ideas and plan my career. He also 
gave me advice on how to conduct great research. And, of course, I 
thank Robb Willer for co-supervising this thesis. 
 I want to thank Professor Erik Hölzl and all my colleagues 
(Andrei Boutyline; Dr. Fabian Christandl; Filippo Cordaro, Ph. D.; 
Daniel Ehlebracht; Matthew Feinberg; Thomas Goebbels; Dr, Mareike 
Hoffmann; Vanessa Köneke; Dr. Sebastian Lotz, Dr. Julia Pradel; 
Julia Sauerbrey; Michael Schultz; Olga Stravrova; and Moritz 
Susewind) who inspired me, gave me feedback, and made my time as 
a doctoral student pleasant. Some of them are now my very good 
friends. I want to thank Thomas Goebbels, Sebastian Lotz, Thomas 
Schlösser, and Michael Schultz for their feedback on my thesis. 
Furthermore, I want to thank Thomas Goebbels for organizing a flat 
for me in Cologne before my return from Berkeley and for all his 
subsequent help with renovating the flat and the moving in process. 
Many thanks also go to Thomas Goebbels’ girlfriend, Svenja Keller, 
for taking care of my diet and psychological health in the last two 
months of my work on this thesis. At this point, I also want to thank 
Till van den Bergh, who also helped me with my flat and has been a 
great and supportive friend since I met him.  
  
IX 
Finally, I thank the Cologne Graduate School of Management, 
Economics and Social Sciences for financing my Ph. D., giving me the 
opportunity to go to Berkeley and supporting me with a great and 
interesting program. In particular, I want to thank Professor Dirk 
Sliwka, Dr. Dagmar Weiler and Susanne Ludewig Greiner. 
 My deepest thanks go to my family, my mother Maria, my 
father Jan, my sister Christiane, and my step-parents Gunnar and 
Christina, who supported me during all of my studies. And, of course, 
I feel deeply grateful to my girlfriend Jelena Pavlovic who was always 
there for me and reminded me from time to time that life continues, 
even when you get insignificant results from an experiment. 
 
 
Johannes Ole Mensching 
 
 
 10 
 
 
2. Introduction 
I ask the reader’s forbearance as I relate a true story that has a 
bearing on the topic of this dissertation. While I was working on this 
dissertation, I received a grant for a visit to the University of 
California, Berkeley, for the fall semester 2010 and the beginning of 
the spring semester 2011. In the fall semester I was fortunate to find 
a room in the International House of Berkeley, where I spent a 
wonderful time with 600 other students from all over the world. 
However, the International House only rents rooms for entire 
semesters so I had to search for new accommodations at the end of 
December. I waited too long with my apartment-hunting and 
eventually wanted to make an agreement with an elderly woman 
(Helen) just 2 weeks before I left the United States for a 9-day trip 
with my girlfriend in Europe. To be precise, I did not really formalize 
the agreement, but mentioned on the phone that I would like to take 
the room, and my future landlady said, “OK”. When I asked her how 
much I would have to pay as a deposit, she answered that this would 
not be necessary. That aroused my curiosity. I explained to Helen 
that this was foolhardy since she did not know me, and I could 
change my mind and rent another flat, so she might end up with her 
room unrented. I asked her why she would trust me. That confused 
the old lady. At first she did not answer my question but asked me 
whether I intended to be a “bad boy.” Then Helen told me that it 
would be too big a hassle to demand a security deposit because that 
would mean going to a bank or making an appointment with me. 
Nevertheless, my rational deliberations that I communicated 
unfiltered to my future landlady had a lasting effect as I would learn 
very soon. Just before I left the United States, Helen said she wanted 
to cancel my room rental, informing me that she thought I did not 
intend to show up. I had to write a few emails and provide some 
explanations to convince her that I am trustworthy. When I was 
eventually living in Helen’s flat, I noticed that she was a quite 
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suspicious person. Every other week she forwarded me the 
community alert email and told me how dangerous Berkeley was. 
When I had a very painful gastritis flare up, she tried to convince me 
to go to a general doctor she trusted, reasoning that most doctors are 
untrustworthy and just want to make money.  
 This story relates quite well to the topic of this work. I will 
examine human trust behavior on the individual level. I provided this 
real-world example to underline that the goal of this work is to 
examine trust as it emerges in everyday life and not as an abstract 
construct that is important only in the ivory tower.  
 Turning the scientific spotlight on the topic of trust, it becomes 
apparent that Helen behaved like many people when they are put into 
a trust situation. People trust strangers in anonymous one-shot 
interactions (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Eckel & Wilson, 2000, 
2004) although they should not do so according to a strictly rational 
point of view advocated by economic or rational choice theorists. 
 In addition, high trust rates are observed although people are 
generally cynical about the trustworthiness of their potential 
interaction partners (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). 
In other words, people are suspicious cognitively but behave as 
trusting individuals on the behavioral side (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 
2009, 2010a, 2010b). Furthermore, people accept more risks in trust 
situations than in risky situations void of trust (Fetchenhauer & 
Dunning, 2009, 2010b). Even, the phenomenon that trust can 
suddenly vanish, when potentially negative consequences of trust are 
brought to a person’s attention was shown empirically (Kugler, 
Connolly, & Kausel, 2009), and I will come back to this at the end of 
my work. 
 However, the main question at the center of this work is not 
why people distrust, but why people do trust. Trying to answer this 
question, I will apply game theoretical paradigms in experimental 
settings. Mainly, I will focus on explanations that assume people 
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trust because of consequential considerations, meaning that people 
use trust as an instrument to accomplish or avoid a certain outcome. 
 However, I will also discuss whether people trust because of 
factors and dynamics that are unrelated to the outcome of a trust 
decision but influence participants at the very moment they make 
their decision to trust. Such factors and dynamics include social 
norms, personality, or emotions. 
 Furthermore, I will review whether findings of previous 
research about trust might be the result of methodological flaws, and 
I will examine behavior in trust situations that occur in everyday life 
but have not been previously considered in an experimental setting.  
 Unfortunately, I will not find out why people trust. However, I 
will show which explanations fail to explain trust and how our ideas 
about trust have to be changed in order to clarify this phenomenon. 
At the end of this work, I will suggest some studies that should be 
carried out in the future and provide a look at additional fields of 
trust research. 
2.1. Why trust is important 
“The advantage to humankind of being able to trust one another 
penetrates into every crevice and cranny of human life.” 
     (John Stuart Mill, 1848) 
 
John Stuart Mill claimed more than 160 years ago that trust 
has a beneficial impact on every part of human life. From a present-
day perspective, we can say that Mill’s claim contained amazing 
foresight. In the present day, the positive effects of trust have been 
examined by scholars of various disciplines, including economists, 
sociologists, and psychologists. Some positive effects of trust are 
pretty obvious. Most people would agree that trust is an 
indispensable prerequisite for romantic or amicable relationships. 
Indeed, this can be corroborated by psychological research (Bierhoff, 
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1992; Miller & Rempel, 2004). High levels of interpersonal trust are 
also associated with happiness, mental as well as physical health, 
and a longer life (Barefoot, Maynard, Beckham, Brummett, Hooker, & 
Siegler, 1998; Rotters, 1980). However, trust also plays an important 
role in parts of human life that are not so self-evident. 
Economists have emphasized the importance of trust in 
economic transactions. Arrow (1972) argued that “virtually every 
commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust” (p. 357). 
Arrow (1974) emphasized the importance of trust to decrease 
transaction costs. Trust can diminish costs of contracts, monitoring 
and right enforcement between business partners - no matter 
whether the transactions are between individuals or companies. 
Thus, the existence of trust in business relationships is a competitive 
advantage (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Dyer & Chu, 2003).  
Trust also has positive effects on a societal level, which was 
particularly underlined in Putnam’s (1993) book Making Democracy 
Work. Although Putnam did not examine trust directly but trust as a 
crucial part of social capital, which also consists of social norms and 
networks, the book triggered a multitude of trust research at the 
societal level (e.g., Beugelsdijk, Groot, & Schaik, 2004; Whiteley, 
2000; Zak & Knack, 2001). Researchers have argued that trust at a 
societal level reduces transaction costs (Fukuyama, 1995, Whiteley, 
2000), which represent up to 60% of the entire gross domestic 
product (GDP) of a developed country (Dollery & Leong, 1998; Wallis 
& North, 1986; for a review, see Wang, 2003). In fact, a variety of 
studies showed that trust levels or social capital between countries 
can predict differences in their economic growth (Fetchenhauer & 
Van der Vegt, 2001; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000; Zak & 
Knack, 2001). Furthermore, trust has been positively related to the 
quality and maintenance of democracies and governments 
(Fukuyama, 1995; Knack, 2002; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 1993) and 
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negatively related to corruption (Rothstein & Eek, 2009; Rothstein & 
Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner, 2002). 
In summary, trust shapes the private, economic, and civic life 
of people, and the effects of trust can be measured at an individual, 
organizational, and societal level. However, the question emerges:  
What is trust? The next section shows that also the definitions of 
trust are as multifaceted. 
2.2. Definition of trust 
“Trust is a term with many meanings.” 
   (Oliver Williamson, 1993) 
 
Trust is such a prevalent and frequently discussed 
phenomenon that one might think that it has no clear definition. 
People trust that their romantic partners are faithful, or that their 
friends will repay a loan. They even trust that the radio purchased 
from an unknown private seller at a flea market will work when they 
get home and plug it into a socket. Though these examples seem to 
be very different at first glance, in the following section, I will point 
out their common elements.  
First, the examples given reveal that trust is inseparably linked 
to the future (Sztompka 1999; Williamson, 1993). In the future, one 
will learn whether a friend will repay the money or whether the radio 
they bought will work. 
Second, trust always involves risk (Coleman, 1990; Gambetta, 
2000; Hardin, 2006; McKnight & Chervany, 2001). People do not 
know whether events, in which they trust, will occur in the future. 
Although they trust their romantic partner, they risk learning 
sometime in the future that their trust was groundless.   
Third, when people accept risk in a trust situation, they make 
themselves vulnerable. They accept bearing the cost if events they 
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trust in do not occur in the future (Coleman, 1990). Referring to one 
of my examples, one’s money is lost if the radio he bought at the flea 
market does not work when he tries to use it at home. In this case he 
has to bear the cost of not being able to listen to the news or the cost 
of buying another radio. 
Fourth, trust occurs only if one voluntarily takes on the risk 
and vulnerability in a trust situation (Gambetta, 2000; Hardin, 2006). 
If someone lends his friend money only because he feels morally 
obliged to do so, his decision is not connected with trust. 
Fifth, the risk people take in trust situations is related to other 
people (Coleman, 1990; Sztompka, 1999). This is not immediately 
obvious because people use the word trust in their everyday language 
when they are talking about things. People use phrases like “trusting 
in the government” or “trusting that an airplane will not crash.” 
Indeed, in these examples one can point out that they eventually 
trust other humans. Every government consists of politicians, and 
when people trust that an airplane will not crash, they really trust 
that the airplane is well constructed by the engineers who built it and 
will be flown by responsible pilots.  
Finally, a question arises about why people voluntarily make 
themselves vulnerable to other people and risk being hurt by these 
people in the future? The reason people do this is that they have 
positive expectations about the future (Sztompka, 1999). They expect 
that their romantic partner will be faithful, and they expect that the 
radio they bought at the flea-market will work at home. These 
positive expectations can be considered as the psychological state of 
trust or cognitive trust.  
There are a myriad of definitions of trust in the literature (see 
McKnight & Chervany (2001) for an overview). The examples 
discussed above provide a general and comprehensive idea about 
what trust is. These elements are taken from a definition by 
Rousseau, et al. (1998) that is based on an interdisciplinary literature 
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review. They defined trust as “a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of 
the intentions or the behavior of another” (p. 395).  
Still, trust is mostly related to behavior (buying the radio, 
lending money) or is sometimes even defined as a behavior (see 
McKnight & Chervany, 2001 for an overview). The behavioral 
component of trust is not covered in the definition of Rousseau et al. 
(1998). However, it is important to differentiate between the 
psychological state of trust that comprises positive expactations 
about the future and trust behavior which only means that somebody 
is making himself vulnerable and dependent on another person. The 
reason is that from observations of trustful behavior the 
psychological state of trust cannot be inferred or vice versa 
(Fetchenhauer and Dunning, 2009; Dunning and Fetchenhauer, 
2010). I have shown this in the example above in which somebody 
loaned money to his friend because he felt morally obligated. Thus, I 
will refer to the psychological state of trust as “trust on the cognitive 
side” while the behavioral act of making oneself vulnerable and 
dependent on another person will be referred to as “trust behavior” or 
“trust on the behavioral side”. In the discussion, I will show that trust 
even has an emotional component. 
 For the further consideration of trust in this dissertation, it 
also makes sense to distinguish between two different kinds of trust: 
particularized and generalized trust. Particularized trust is trust that 
people have in specific other persons they have information on. 
Particularized trust decisions are often shaped by face-to-face contact 
and reputation. In contrast, generalized trust is shown to strangers, 
people about whom one has no information (Bjornskov, 2006, 
Nannestad, 2008). In this work I will consider generalized trust only. 
While most scholars will likely agree that the definitions I gave 
in this section describe the essence of trust quite well, there is a 
controversy about whether trust situations are inherently different 
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from risk situations void of trust. The next section sheds light on the 
mainstream position on that issue. 
2.3. Economic and rational choice accounts of trust 
 
 “Situations involving trust constitute a subclass of those 
involving risk. They are situations in which the risk one takes 
depends on the performance of another actor.” 
        (Coleman, 1990) 
 
 According to today’s prevailing understanding of trust, people 
confide in one another on the basis of rational considerations about 
the outcomes of their trust decision, which are essentially the same 
considerations people apply to risky decisions void of trust. This 
understanding is rooted in very decisive assumptions about human 
nature, which are these days supported by neoclassical economists 
and rational choice sociologists (Berg et al., 1995; Coleman, 1990; 
Sztompka, 1999; Williamson, 1993). The first assumption is that 
people are egoistic utility maximizers. The second one is that people 
behave in a strictly rational manner. The last assumption is that 
people have the intelligence and strategic competence to behave 
rationally on the basis of all available information they have. This 
image of humanity is condensed in the concept of the homo 
oeconomicus. It is not entirely clear who used this term the first time 
(O’Boyle, 2008). However, one can trace the ideas that eventually led 
to the homo oeconomicus construct. These ideas are very old and were 
used by many important scholars. Because today’s models of human 
behavior and decision making stem from the homo oeconomicus or 
particularly challenge this concept, I will illuminate the genesis of 
this idea in the next paragraphs more thoroughly.  
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2.3.1. The roots of homo oeconomicus 
 The idea that man is inherently egoistic can be already found in 
Plato’s (2000[360BC]) The Republic. In this book Plato provides a 
dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon in which Glaucon tells the 
story of the shepherd Gyges. Gyges finds a golden ring that can make 
him invisible. He uses this power to seduce the queen and replaces 
the king after slaying him. Glaucon argues that every person with the 
same power would behave like Gyges, and that everyone who did not 
“would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot” (p. 
44).  
 The concept of man as a rational actor can also be ascribed to 
the ancient Greeks. Aristotle referred to humans as rational animals. 
However, the ancient Greeks had a broader and less specified concept 
of rationality than people today (Rutgers, 1999).  
 Today scholars associate two people with the homo oeconomicus 
concept and the image of man as egoistic and self-serving. The first 
one is Niccolò Machiavelli, and the second is Thomas Hobbes. 
Machiavelli’s (2003[1532]) The Prince not only described man as 
immanently egoistic and self-serving like no one before him but also 
promoted the idea that one has to act in an unscrupulous and 
calculating manner in order to be successful.  
However, much more important in shaping the homo 
oeconomicus theory was Thomas Hobbes’ (2009[1651]) Leviathan. In 
this book, Hobbes merged the traits of egoism and rationalism in one 
image of humanity. In addition, Hobbes provided a subjective 
conception of values that formed the basis for the development of 
utility theory (Cudd, 1993). He suggested that human action is based 
on subjective appetites and aversions, which are the last 
consequences of rational deliberations. Hobbes argued that these 
deliberations are best if they are a valid basis of the eventual 
consequences of an action. However, Hobbes stated that “seldome 
any man is able to see to the end” (p. 32), whereas the homo 
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oeconomicusis is endowed with an unbounded rationality and infinite 
processing capacity (Rolle, 2005; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003).  
The idea of utility theory was already latently present in 
Hobbes’ (2009[1651]) Leviathan and can be found more clearly in the 
work of Locke and Hutcheson (Russell, 1945). A big contribution to 
utility theory was also made by Bernoulli who suggested that the 
value of any item should not be measured by its price but by the 
utility it yields (Cudd, 1993). However, the first one who used utility 
theory to solve actual problems and draw the attention of the 
collective mind to this idea was Jeremy Bentham (Stigler, 1950). 
Bentham’s approach to utility was broader and more specified than 
Bernoulli’s. He suggested that all pleasures and pains can be 
subsumed in one utility index by taking into account the intensity, 
duration, certainty, and propinquity of pleasures and pains. 
At the same time that Bentham was developing his utility 
theory, the idea of unbounded rationality and full information 
emerged because mathematics thrived in the early 19th century. The 
idea is symbolized in Laplace’s (1951[1814]) demon that knows the 
condition of every atom in the universe and all laws of nature and is 
endowed with a super-intelligence that allows him to calculate the 
future, which is entirely determined by strict causality (Rolle, 2005; 
Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003). As already mentioned above, this idea was 
incorporated in the image of the homo oeconomicus. The homo 
oeconomicus behaves rationally in a determined world and has the 
intelligence as well as strategic capability to do so (Rolle, 2005). 
However, the homo oeconomicus does not have full information but 
collects all information he can acquire by natural means in a 
situation (Guckelsberger, 2006). This is important for any further 
analysis since, if the homo oeconomicus were the demon of Laplace, 
he would not have to trust but would know the future and could 
decide on the basis of determined certainty. 
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2.3.2. The birth of homo oeconomicus 
Today scholars see Bentham’s student John Stuart Mill as the 
father of the homo oeconomicus (Guckelsberger, 2006; Persky, 1995, 
Rolle, 2005). Mill (1909[1848)) proposed to analyze the economy with 
the help of an abstraction of man so that economics “is concerned 
with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is 
capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining 
that end” (p. 326). This quote entails a subtle representation of the 
attributes ascribed to the homo oeconomicus: egoistc utility 
maximizing as well as superhuman rationality. However, Mill made 
clear that he was only speaking about an abstraction that is useful 
for economic analysis. He also emphasized that humans in real life 
are much more complex individuals. Nevertheless, in reaction to 
Mill’s work, the term economic man and then the term homo 
oeconomicus were coined and associated with the abstraction of 
humans that is still used today in economic and sociological analyses 
(Persky, 1995).  
2.3.3. Conclusions of the homo oeconomicus concept for trust 
decisions 
Applying the construct of the homo oeconomicus in trust 
situations, people use trust as an instrument to maximize their 
utility. One can easily determine in which situations he or she (the 
trustor) should trust. Assuming that the current utility of the 
potential trustor will not change, if he distrusts, he should trust only 
if the expected value that will accrue from the decision to trust is 
positive (Coleman, 1990). The expected value of trusting equals the 
probability that the trustee is dependable times the gain or utility the 
trustor will receive in this case minus the probability that the trustee 
will be untrustworthy times the loss or disutility the trustor will 
suffer in this case. This analysis shows that from an economic or 
rational choice perspective a trust decision does not differ from a risk 
decision void of trust.  
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Furthermore, from the perspective of the homo oeconomicus, 
not only the trustor but also the trustee should behave rationally and 
egoistically. Accordingly, trustees should only behave trustworthily if 
it is in their own interest to do so. This in turn has an effect on the 
decision of the trustor. A rational trustor can anticipate the behavior 
of the trustee because the behavior and best (rational) strategy in a 
decision situation is common knowledge (Aumann & Brandenburger, 
1995). Hence, trustors should trust only if it is in the interest of the 
trustee to be trustworthy. This kind of trust has been discussed 
under various names in the literature: trust as encapsulated interest 
(Hardin, 2006), calculative trust (Williamson, 1993), or self-interested 
trust (Lyons & Mehta, 1997).  
As my example from the introduction suggests, everyday life 
seems to contradict these strong assumptions about the nature of 
trust. People do not seem to base their trust on calculative 
considerations. However, trust situations in real life are very complex, 
so it is hard to tell why somebody should be trusted in a real-life 
situation. Maybe my landlady told the truth. Although it seems very 
odd, she might have reserved the room for me without the security 
deposit because the hassle to make a deposit loomed larger for her 
than her estimated financial loss if I did not show up, and she 
weighed this against the expected probability of that happening. 
To clarify this question, trust has to be considered in a more 
controlled environment.  
2.4. How to measure trust towards strangers 
 In social surveys like the World Value Survey (WVS), the 
American General Social Survey (GSS), or the European Social 
Survey (ESS), trust towards strangers is measured by the question: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” This one-item 
measure is advantageous because it can be collected quickly and 
easily from a large number of people. However, it is also a very 
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abstract and vague measure of trust (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, 
& Soutter, 2000). In addition, the trust people indicate in a self-
reported study does not have any consequences for the respondents. 
Hence, it is possible that the respondents do not reveal their true 
attitudes but answer in a socially desirable way (Holtgraves, 2004). 
Economists generally distrust self-reports and even experimental 
data in which collected decisions are not monetarily incentivized 
(Smith & Walker, 1993). For these reasons, the present work 
examining trust is based on data collected in an experimental setting 
in which participants made real trust decisions for real money.   
2.4.1. The trust game 
 The experimental setting I applied in this work is the binary 
trust game, a variation of the investment game (Berg et al., 1995), 
which is based on the “game of trust” (Güth & Kliemt, 1994) that in 
turn is originally based on the centipede game (Rosenthal, 1981). 
These were games first used by game theorists. Recently, behavioral 
economists and psychologists have also used the investment game 
and trust game to examine human trust behavior (e.g., Bohnet & 
Zeckhauser, 2004, Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008; Eckel & 
Wilson, 2000, 2004; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009, 2010a, 2010b).  
In the investment game, two people interact anonymously via 
an experimenter. Both of them are endowed with a show-up fee. One 
participant (the trustor) can decide to keep his money or to hand over 
any fraction of it to the second person (the trustee). All money the 
trustor hands over is tripled by the experimenter before it is given to 
the trustee. Then the trustee has an opportunity to keep all received 
money for himself or to reciprocate that trust by sending any amount 
of money back to the trustor (Berg et al., 1995). 
 The binary trust game differs only slightly from the investment 
game (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). In this game, 
only the trustor is endowed with a show-up fee (e.g., €5), and he can 
decide only to distrust and keep all the money or trust and hand all 
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the money over to the trustee. If the trustor hands over the money to 
the trustee, it is multiplied (e.g., 4 times) by the experimenter and 
given to the trustee. The trustee then has an opportunity to be 
untrustworthy and to keep all the money (€20 in this example) or to 
be trustworthy and give half of it (€10 in this example) back to the 
trustor. 
While the investment game deals with continuous trust 
decisions, the binary trust game deals with dichotomous ones. For 
this work, I used the binary trust game for two reasons. First, as 
mentioned above, this work should consider trust as it emerges in 
everyday life, and in the real world, trust decisions are mostly binary. 
People cannot buy only half of a used car because they do not trust 
the car dealer entirely. In the same way, a people cannot marry one 
another just a little bit because they are not totally sure that they 
love the potential partner. Second, in the investment game it is not 
entirely clear which behavior can be interpreted as a signal of trust 
and trustworthiness. On the side of the trustor, it is hard to say 
whether trustors who send only a tiny fraction of their show-up fee 
are signaling trust or distrust. With regard to trustees, it is 
ambiguous which behavior can be interpreted as trustworthy. A 
study by Pillutla, Mahotra, and Murninghan (2003) suggested that 
trustees consider it to be a signal of distrust if the trustor sends less 
than the maximum amount to them. In turn, the rate of reciprocation 
drops dramatically. The binary trust game avoids such interpretation 
problems. 
2.4.2. Measures of trust in the trust game  
The investment game was designed as a pure behavioral 
measure of trust and trustworthiness (Berg et al., 1995). It was 
implicitly assumed that trustors who handed over money to the 
trustee did so because they considered the trustee to be reliable. 
However, I have already pointed out that trust on the behavioral side 
does not have to cohere to the psychological state of trust (trust on 
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the cognitive side). Avoiding this potential pitfall, Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning (2009, 2010a) asked the trustors in their binary trust games 
to estimate the percentage of people that would behave in a 
trustworthy way in the role of the trustee before they made their 
decision. Thus, Fetchenhauer and Dunning extended the trust game 
by a cognitive measure of trust. 
Although the cognitive measure of trust potentially suffers from 
the shortcomings of self-reports discussed above, the cognitive 
measure of trust was used in all underlying studies for this work. 
However, there are two reasons that the estimates of trustors should 
be a valid measure of their cognitive trust. First, in contrast to the 
one-item scale used in the WVS, GSS, and ESS, trustors in the trust 
game estimate the trustworthiness of others in a concrete and 
narrowly defined situation. Second, Fetchenhauer and Dunning 
(2010a) did not find any evidence that trustors do not reveal their 
true beliefs about the trustworthiness of others when their estimates 
are not incentivized. They compared the estimates of a group of 
trustors whose accuracy was monetarily incentivized to the estimates 
of a group of trustors whose accuracy was not incentivized. However, 
the quality of estimates did not differ significantly between both 
groups. 
2.4.3. Basic findings in the trust- and investment game 
 Researchers who applied the trust or investment game reported 
that about 40-95% of trustors hand over money to a trustee and 
about 70-90% of trustees prove trustworthy and give money back to 
the trustor (Berg et al., 1995; Eckel & Wilson, 2000, 2004; 
Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009, 2010a). These findings strongly 
contradict the strict economic or rational choice approach to trust, 
which would predict that no trustee would prove to be reliable in this 
game and no trustor would hand over money.   
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2.5. Scientific integration of this work 
The results of the trust and investment game as well as 
findings in other experimental games in which people do not behave 
according to economic principles have caused a change of thinking in 
economic science. The strict assumptions about the homo 
oeconomicus have been relaxed. Social preferences have been 
integrated in the utility function of economic subjects (Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 
2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), and the assumption of unbounded 
rationality has been rejected (Gigerenzer, 2008; Simon, 1959).  
The newer economic approaches to human behavior differ to 
the extent that they break with the strict neoclassical assumptions. 
The accounts of most behavioral economists are still rooted in the 
strict economic tradition. They assume human behavior and human 
considerations are strictly consequential. According to this 
perspective, people only consider the consequences (outcomes) of 
their behavior. Accordingly, social preferences like fairness are 
considered as preferences for the outcomes of others (Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
In contrast to this perspective, other scholars have made a 
more radical break with the neoclassical assumptions. They assume 
that human behavior is instead driven by intentions or emotions not 
just based on considerations about outcomes (Charness & Rabin, 
2002; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; van Winden, 2007). Returning to 
the example of fairness behavior from the last paragraph, according 
to intention- or emotion-based models, people are fair because they 
feel grateful or want to reciprocate kindness but do not think so 
much about the outcomes of their decisions. 
 If this framework is applied to the matter of trust, a question 
emerges about whether people use trust instrumentally to 
accomplish or avoid certain outcomes or whether trust is a behavior 
that is not driven by outcomes. Until this point, many researchers 
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have tested explanations of trust behavior that consider trust as a 
consequential behavior. These explanations empirically failed to 
elucidate trust (e.g., Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 
2009, 2010b; Houser, Schunk, & Winter, 2010). Hence, a change in 
thinking might be necessary to explain trust behavior towards 
strangers. This phenomenon is possibly only explainable when trust 
is considered to be non-consequential but based on emotions, norms, 
or other dynamics that influence people while they make a decision to 
trust or distrust (Dunning & Fetchenhauer, 2010). 
 However, many consequential explanations regarding trust 
behavior have not been tested so far. Furthermore, it is possible that 
former findings contradicting the idea that trust is a consequential 
behavior were caused by methodological weaknesses. Building on the 
research that has already been done on the question of why people 
trust, this work should provide a more comprehensive, 
methodologically decisive, and systematical test of consequential 
explanations of trust.  
 In addition, at the end of this work I will provide an overview of 
newer research on non-consequential explanations of trust and make 
suggestions for further research. 
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3. Overview of current research 
In Chapter 4, I will provide an overview of the findings and 
insights gained in experimental trust research. I will then discuss 
common consequential explanations and potential methodological 
reasons for high trust rates. Finally, I will present an empirical study 
in which all these explanations were tested using a between-subjects 
design. 
  In this study, my coauthors and I could not find out why people 
trust, but we showed which explanations fail to explain trust. First, 
we showed that trust rates did not decrease when participants had to 
hand over their own money, compared to past studies in which 
participants played with a show-up fee (house money effects). For the 
first time, we conducted a trust game in which trustors could only 
hand over their own money; however, similar to what occurred in 
past studies, 57.1% of trustors did so. Second, anticipating high rates 
of trustworthiness was not the reason for participants to trust. In 
fact, they underestimated this share by almost 20 percentage points. 
Third, high trust rates were not explainable by high risk tolerance. 
Only 25.3% of participants were willing to bet money, making a risky 
decision identical in gains and similar in risks to the trust game but 
void of trust. However, trust games entail second players who can 
benefit from the money trustors hand over. Therefore, trustors might 
hand over money because they have preferences for equality or want 
to enlarge the pie. Contradicting these arguments, only 28.3% of 
participants bet money in a risky decision, which was not only 
similar to the trust game regarding gains and risks but also those 
involving a second player. Thus, we could not find evidence that trust 
can be explained by one of the explanations we tested. 
Chapter 5 deals with the question of how people behave in 
trust situations in which they cannot be better off if their trust is 
reciprocated by the partner with whom they interact (trustee). Former 
studies have examined only trust decisions in which people who trust 
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(trustors) were rewarded if the person with whom they interacted 
proved to be trustworthy.  Thus, it is not clear to what extent the 
strategic motive to be better off plays a role in trust decisions in 
general. In Chapter 5, I present a study on that issue.  
Using a full between-subjects design, this study examined non-
strategic trust decisions in which participants cannot be better off or 
even only worse off by trusting others for the first time. To do this, 
my coauthors and I systematically manipulated the potential gains in 
trust games and compared them with lotteries void of any trust but 
equal in risks and gains. Our results show that both trust behavior 
and risky behavior unrelated to trust were dependent on potential 
gains and losses. However, whereas the number of risky decisions 
decreased to almost zero in lotteries entailing no or negative gains, 
trust behavior was comparably stable. Chapter 5 provides evidence 
that people do not trust strategically and that high trust rates are 
sustainable in different kinds of trust situations. 
While I considered only explanations for trust behavior that are 
basically consequential in Chapters 4 and 5, I go one step further in 
Chapter 6. Here, I examine whether trust behavior in trust games is 
driven by the curiosity trustors feel in the moment they make their 
trust decision. Thereby, I illuminate the question whether the 
paradigm of the trust game itself causes the phenomenon of high 
trust rates. In addition, I examine the influence of regret aversion (the 
tendency of people to avoid future regret) on trust. In order to give an 
answer to this question, I present a study in Chapter 6 in which my 
coauthors and I compared a trust game with conditional feedback to 
a trust game with unconditional feedback (between-subjects).  
Trustors in ordinary trust games receive conditional feedback 
only. That means they learn the trustworthiness of their trustee on 
the condition that they hand over their money to him or her. Thus, 
trustors might hand over money in trust games because they want to 
know whether their trustee is reliable. To find out, we compared an 
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ordinary trust game with conditional feedback to a trust game with 
unconditional feedback in which trustors always learned the 
trustworthiness of their interaction partner. In this trust game, 
trustors were always informed about the decision of their assigned 
trustee, no matter whether they kept or handed over their money.  
Whereas the curiosity hypothesis predicts that more trustors 
hand over money when they receive conditional feedback, regret 
aversion would predict that fewer people will do so.  
In the trust game with unconditional feedback, trustors cannot 
avoid potential regret triggered by their decision to keep or to hand 
over money. Trustors, who keep the money, run the risk of learning 
that their trustee was reliable and that they would have doubled their 
money had they handed it over. Trustors, who hand over their 
money, run the risk of learning that their trustee was untrustworthy 
and that they would not have lost their money had they kept it. Thus, 
regret aversion should not influence trustors to make a particular 
decision in the trust game with unconditional feedback. However, in 
the trust game with conditional feedback, trustors can avoid potential 
regret by keeping the money because then they will never learn 
whether their assigned trustee was reliable and that they would have 
doubled their money, if they had handed it over. Therefore, regret 
aversion should influence trustors in the trust game with conditional 
feedback to keep their money. 
However, we did not find any difference between the trust rates 
in the trust game with conditional feedback and the trust game with 
unconditional feedback. Hence, neither the curiosity nor the regret 
hypothesis could be supported. At the end of Chapter 6, I discuss 
which implications these findings could have for further research. 
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4. Why do people trust? 
 “You must trust and believe in people 
or life becomes impossible.” 
Anton Chekov 1860 – 1906 
4.1. Introduction 
Trust is an indispensable prerequisite for the functionality of 
human societies. No matter whether we buy something on ebay or 
start an intimate relationship – we have to trust and believe in other 
people. The introductory quote by Anton Chekov points out that this 
realization is nothing new. However, recent research gives a very 
thorough insight into how substantial trust is for the working of 
democracies (Putnam, 1993), growth of economies (Fukuyama, 1995; 
Knack & Keefer, 1997) and societies in general (Coleman, 1990; 
Sztompka, 1999). 
But why do people trust? Economists and rational choice 
sociologists have a simple and distinct answer to this question, 
claiming that people maximize their own utility and, thus, trust when 
this decision entails positive expected outcomes (Coleman, 1990). 
However, newer studies can show that people in trust situations do 
not behave like this. In fact, they even trust strangers, who have no 
reason to be trustworthy but have an incentive to exploit them (Berg 
et al., 1995; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). These 
studies, implementing a more psychological view on trust, emphasize 
that people might base their trust decisions on motivations apart 
from the maximization of utility. 
The purpose of this paper is to test common explanations for 
trust behavior, namely: 1. house money effects (do people hand over 
money, because it is not their own money but a show-up fee?) 2. 
beliefs of trustworthiness (do people hand over money because they 
assume that most trustees will be trustworthy and will give them 
more money back?) 3. risk tolerance (do people hand over money 
because they are just risk seeking) 4. preferences for equality (do 
 31 
 
 
people hand over money because they want the trustee to get an 
amount of money equal to theirs?) and 5. preferences for enlarging 
the pie (do people hand over money because this decision generally 
enlarges the total sum of money participants can receive in this 
game?) 
When analyzing trust, economists as well as psychologists 
often use the investment game or the trust game (Berg et al., 1995; 
Eckel & Wilson, 2000, 2004; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009). In a 
binary variation of the trust game, which was e.g. used by 
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) and which we applied in this 
study, a trustor and a trustee are involved, who are interacting 
anonymously via an experimenter. The trustor can decide to either 
keep or hand over €5 to the trustee. If the trustor gives the money to 
the trustee, the experimenter quadruples the €5 so that the trustee 
receives €20 in total. Then the trustee has an opportunity to keep the 
whole amount, or to reciprocate by sharing the €20 equally with the 
trustor. 
Following the economic theory of homo oeconomicus - that 
people only maximize their own utility (Persky, 1995) - the best 
strategy for trustees is to keep the entire money for themselves. And, 
in line with the common knowledge assumption, which claims that 
not only each participant is informed about the “best” strategy but 
also, that each participant knows that every other participant knows 
the best strategy etc. (Aumann & Brandenburger, 1995), trustors can 
anticipate the selfish behavior of trustees and, thus, rationally should 
not hand over any money. 
Contradicting that logic, research shows empirically that a 
substantial percentage of trustors hands over its money in several 
variations of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995, Eckel & Wilson, 2000, 
2004; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009). So obviously, trustors do not 
behave in accordance with economic or rational choice theory – so 
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why do they trust? In the following we discuss five common 
explanations for that phenomenon. 
4.1.1. Potential Explanations for Trust Behavior 
 Beliefs of trustworthiness. Considering the empirical results 
of trust games it is eye-catching that not only 40%-95% of trustors 
hand over money, but also that most trustees (70%-90%) prove 
trustworthy and give money back (Eckel and Wilson, 2004; 
Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009; McCabe, Rigdon and Smith, 2003). 
Could it be that trustors do not behave irrationally at all, but just 
maximize their utility by giving money away, because most trustees 
reciprocate trust and send back more money than trustors have 
initially sent to them? 
 This argumentation has one flaw - it reduces trust to 
observable behavior. But trust has also a cognitive component. This 
becomes clear when considering a multi-perspective definition of 
trust by Rousseau et al. (1998), who defined trust as “a psychological 
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or the behavior of another” (p. 
395). Researchers often infer that behavior and cognition correspond 
to another. This assumption is highly plausible and people do that in 
everyday life as well because behavior is the only information they 
can observe in most situations. Accordingly, most trustors would 
hand over money to trustees, because they consider most of the 
trustees as trustworthy. 
 However, Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009, 2010a) showed 
that this is actually not true. They measured not only the behavior of 
trustors in several trust games, but also their estimations about the 
average trustworthiness of the trustees. Stable findings revealed that 
trustors underestimate the trustworthiness of trustees by rates of 30-
35 percentage points on average, however, most of them trusted 
(Fetchenhauer & Dunning 2009, 2010a). Evidently, people are too 
cynical when estimating the trustworthiness of others. Hence, they 
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do not hand over money because they consider this as a safe bet. It 
seems very odd that people express a high cynicism about others on 
the cognitive side, but show high trust on the behavioral one.  
Risk tolerance. People underestimate the trustworthiness of 
others by a substantial amount; but is it possible that the 
underestimated rates of trustworthiness are still high enough for 
people to hand over their money because they are just risk seeking? 
This can only be true, if people base their decisions in trust 
situations on the perceived risk. 
 The recent literature strongly denies that. Eckel and Wilson 
(2004) as well as Ben-Nur and Halldorsson (2010) did not find a 
relation between participant’s general risk attitudes and their 
decision to trust in a trust game. Houser, Schunk, and Winter (2010) 
replicated this finding applying a variation of the trust game. 
Moreover, Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2010b) pointed out that 
people`s decision to trust is not only independent of their general risk 
attitudes, but also of the specifically perceived risk in trust situations. 
Hereby, they showed that people react quite sensitively on risk in 
ordinary risk situations but quite insensitively in trust situations. 
Summarized, risk attitudes can neither explain why people trust on a 
behavioral level but distrust on a cognitive one, nor seems trust to be 
a decision that is related to risk at all.   
House money effects. The findings of the last paragraph 
strongly contradict the conjecture that trust is a pure risk decision 
and, therefore, the economic or rational choice approach to trust. 
However, we think that these findings could be biased because in 
past studies that focused on explanations for trust behavior trust 
games were always conducted with money that fell in participants’ 
laps. Yet, in real life situations people rarely have to make decisions 
with money that has just been handed to them and it should feel 
differently to decide about your very own money. Thaler and Johnson 
(1990) as well as Weber and Zuchel (2001) showed exactly that; 
 34 
 
 
people are much more risk-seeking with given money than with their 
own. 
 Furthermore, trustors might feel coerced to go for the risky 
option with given money because they could think that the 
experimenter wants them to take part in the trust situation. So, they 
would perceive the show-up fee from the beginning not as regular 
money, but as money which was assigned to a special purpose and 
behave in the assumed social desired way. Finally, trustors could 
conceive it as boring to just rake in the show-up fee. Thus, they 
would hand over money because the thrill to take part looms larger 
than the loss of some play money. 
 Thus, it is possible that trustors in former studies just handed 
over money because they were playing with house money. That could 
also explain why former studies found big differences between trust 
on the cognitive side (estimates of trustworthiness) and the 
behavioral side (percentage of trustors who handed over money). 
According to house money effects, trustors indeed anticipated to lose 
their money when handing it over, however, they just did not care to 
lose that house money. Therefore, we want to examine whether the 
findings discussed above are still valid in the absence of house money, 
when participants have to make decisions with their own money.  
 Furthermore, we want to address two explanations for trust 
behavior that – to the best of our knowledge - have not been tested in 
the literature so far. These explanations refer to the fact that in trust 
games, different to other risky situations, another person is involved. 
Though, maybe just the existence of this other person is the reason 
why so many trustors hand over money in this paradigm. That 
should be the case, if trustors care about principles of distributive 
justice; but, which decision of a trustor can be considered as just? 
Preferences for equality. The literature distinguishes various 
principles which can be consulted in distributive decisions. 
Accordingly, goods can be distributed according to equity, equality, 
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needs, effort, input relations and other principles (Adams, 1965; 
Deutsch, 1975). However, to decide which principle to apply in a 
trust game should be quite simple. In this game two persons are 
involved; none of them expends any effort or gives an input, 
furthermore, a certain amount of money falls into the lap of one of 
them (the trustor). Therefore, it is reasonable that trustors apply the 
rule of equality because other principles of distributive justice, such 
as need or equity, do not seem applicable to the presented situation. 
However, if the trustor keeps the money equality cannot be 
accomplished – the trustor will go home with the show up fee and the 
trustee with nothing. Only if the trustor hands over the money, there 
is the chance that both will go home with the same amount of money 
- that is when the trustee shares the received money equally.   
Enlarging the pie. In addition, in some studies by 
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009, 2010a, 2010b) some of their 
participants told them that they handed over their $5 in a binary 
trust game because that way “at least somebody has the $20” (oral 
communication). Could it be that participants wanted to act 
altruistically to enlarge the pie of payments and happiness, ensuring 
that $20 was distributed to individuals in the study regardless of 
whether they shared in this bounty? Within behavioral economics 
Becker (1974) argued that many patterns of economic choices can be 
explained by assuming an altruistic motive to enhance the outcomes 
of all. This motive is reconsidered in the recent economic literature as 
preferences for efficiency (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Coate, 1995; 
Engelmann & Strobel, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Rotemberg, 
1994). Following this logic, choosers should indeed hand over their 
money because that behavior increases the common pie to $20, 
which is considerably more than the $5 distributed if the chooser 
decided to keep the money. 
 36 
 
 
4.1.2. Testing Explanations for Trust Behavior 
 To test all the described explanations for high trust rates, we 
applied 3 risky situations in this study in which participants could 
bet money. However, whereas participants ordinarily take decisions 
for given money in experimental studies, here participants had to 
make all decisions for their own money. First, this design controls for 
house money effects and second, it is much closer to real life 
situations in which people rarely take decisions for given money,.  
 The binary trust game with own money. In line with 
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) we applied a binary variation of 
the trust game in which the trustor can keep or hand over own €5 to 
a trustee. If the trustor gives the money to the trustee, the amount of 
money is increased by €15. The trustee receives €20 in total and then 
has an opportunity to keep the whole amount, or to reciprocate by 
giving back €10 to the trustor. The trust game has been conducted in 
a number of studies, however – to the best of our knowledge - we are 
the first ones who conducted it with participants’ own money. That 
change can shed light on the validity of two explanations. 
 First, it rules out house money effects. That could affect 
trustors’ cognition as well as behavior. As related to cognition, it 
could be the case that trustors, who play the trust game for own 
money, become more risk averse. To lose own money should be much 
more painful than to lose a given show-up fee. Therefore, tustors 
could be prone to rationalize their risk aversion by keeping their own 
money because: “most trustees are untrustworthy anyway” and, thus, 
would become even more cynical regarding the trustworthiness of 
trustees. That is also what the management error theory would 
predict (Hasselton & Buss, 2000). When participants play for their 
own money, it becomes relatively more costly for them to trust an 
untrustworthy person (type II error) than to distrust a trustworthy 
one (type I error). Therefore, it would make sense that people become 
more cynical. However, if house money effects do not have an effect 
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on the cognitions of trustors, we should find equally high rates of 
cynicism like in former studies. 
 Entirely ambiguous is what kind of influence the change from 
given to own money has on the behavior of trustors. Again, trustors 
might become more risk averse and hand over much less money to 
trustees. In line with this argumentation, Dittrich and Ziegelmeyer 
(2005) found in a design of the gift exchange paradigm, in which 
participants had to use own money, dramatic effects of risk aversion. 
That means participants who could lose own money were much more 
risk averse in their behavior than those who could not lose own 
money. 
  However, it is also possible that more instead of fewer trustors 
could hand over money. Schlösser, Fetchenhauer and Dunning 
(2010) found that trustors were strongly influenced in their decision 
by their immediate emotions they had right at the moment they made 
their decision. These immediate emotions could be stronger when 
participants bet their own money and the decision is more realistic. 
In line with this, Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) found that 
trustors, who had to work for the money they could hand over in a 
trust game, trusted significantly more often instead of trusting less 
often than trustors who made a merely hypothetical decision. 
 Finally it is possible that we will not find any difference to 
former trust rates at all. In line with that an influence of house 
money could not be shown in former studies with all kinds of risky 
decisions. It is f.i. unclear whether house money has an effect in 
public good games or not (Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren, 2005; Clark, 
2002; Harrison, 2007). 
 Second, our design also rules out that trustors hand over 
money because they want to accomplish equal distributions. In 
former studies, in which money fell into participants’ laps, property 
rights were ambiguous and equal payoffs seemed to be fair. However, 
if participants are about to hand over own money, property rights are 
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clear and, additionally, only keeping the money can lead to an equal 
distribution (€0/€0). If the trustor hands over his own money (€-5) 
and the trustee reciprocates, the trustor gets €10 back and goes 
home with €-5 + €10 = €5, but the trustee with €10. Even worse, if 
the trustee keeps the money, he will go home with €20, but the 
trustor with a loss of €5. Thus, we not only rule out equality, in fact, 
a preference for equality should even influence trustors to rather 
hand over no money in our design to end with €0/€0. 
 The coin flip. Do trustors hand over money in the trust game 
because they are just risk seeking? To answer this question we have 
to know how risk seeking people are. To measure this, we gave 
participants the choice to bet €5 on a coin flip. In this paradigm 
participants can either keep their own €5 or bet these on the flip of a 
coin. If they win, they receive €10 from the experimenter. If they lose, 
they lose their €5. In the coin flip the objective chance of doubling the 
money is 50%.  
 Past studies concerning the trust game showed that trustors 
perceive about 50% of trustees as trustworthy (Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning 2009, 2010a). Thus, both paradigms seem to be generally 
comparable in matters of perceived risk. On condition that trustors 
also estimate the percentage of trustworthy trustees to be about 50%, 
we can make the following hypotheses: 
If high rates of handing over money are explainable by high risk 
tolerance, we should find similar rates of risky decisions in the coin 
flip and the trust game. If people perceive trust games generally as 
risky situations, but care about equal distributions, we should find 
even lower rates of risky decisions in the trust game than in the coin 
flip. As mentioned above, handing over own money in our trust game 
leads unavoidably to unequal distributions for trustors, whereas 
participants attending the coin flip do not face that problem. 
 Furthermore, the coin flip is used as a reference point for the 
paradigm that is introduced in the next section. 
 39 
 
 
 The extended coin flip. To control whether trustors, who 
hand over money in trust games, want to enlarge the pie we 
introduced the extended coin flip. In this setting a participant can 
keep €5 or bet these on the flip of a coin. Again the participant can 
lose his €5 or get €10 from the experimenter. But in difference to the 
ordinary coin flip, in the extended coin flip another person, the 
beneficiary, is involved. Participants are told that when they bet their 
money and win, the beneficiary will receive €10, too. In the case that 
they bet their money and lose, the beneficiary will receive €20 and if 
they keep their money, the beneficiary will receive nothing. 
 Thus, outcomes in the trust game and the extended coin flip 
are exactly the same for both involved participants. That means 
people that hand over money in the trust game because they want to 
enlarge the pie, should do so to the same extent in the extended coin 
flip. If enlarging the pie is only a part of the explanation for trust 
behavior in the trust game, we can measure through a comparison of 
the ordinary and the extended coin flip how big the influence of this 
motive is. Because the extended coin flip differs from the ordinary 
coin flip only with respect to the second person involved, the 
difference in rates of risky decisions between both paradigms must be 
due to the motive of enlarging the pie.  
4.2. Methods 
 In a between-subjects design overall we collected 425 decisions 
of participants overall in three conditions: the binary trust game, the 
coin flip and the extended coin flip. Material used was thoroughly 
pretested to ensure best comprehensibility. The study was divided 
into three steps.  
4.2.1. Decisions of trustees 
  In the first step, 106 decisions of students from the University 
of Cologne were collected, who took a decision in the binary trust 
game as trustees. Participants had to fill in three 3 control questions 
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that checked whether they understood the decision they should make 
and the consequences of their behavior. We had to exclude 8 
participants from the analysis because of incomplete questionnaires 
or wrong control questions. The 98 remaining participants (70 female) 
were on average 23.51 years old (SD=2.68). They were surveyed 
during a lecture. All decisions were collected via a questionnaire that 
ensured total anonymity by a password. The questionnaires first 
introduced the paradigm to participants and controlled for 
understanding via the control questions. Then participants should 
take their decision as the trustee and indicate whether they would 
keep €20 or give €10 back, when receiving money from the trustor. 
Participants were assured that their decision would become real once 
the randomly assigned trustors would have made their decisions 
within the next 6 weeks.  
4.2.2. The lab experiment 
  In the second step, 319 participants were approached at the 
campus of the University of Cologne. Of these 319 participants we 
had to exclude 23 from analyses because of incomplete 
questionnaires or wrong control questions. The remaining 296 
participants (207 female, 1 n.a.) were on average 23.6 years old 
(SD=2.98). They were invited to our lab and told to bring own €5 
because they would get the possibility to make a monetary decision 
with this money. In the lab, participants were welcomed and 
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (between-subjects). 
That means they got a questionnaire containing the binary trust 
game or the ordinary coin flip or the extended coin flip. Participants 
then filled out their assigned questionnaire in a booth. Again, all 
questionnaires first indicated that the following decision is about the 
participant’s own money and that participants risk to lose their own 
money. Furthermore, it was stressed that participants can, but do 
not have to bet their own money. After that, the questionnaires 
explained the situation to the participants, then controlled for 
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understanding via three control questions and asked for their actual 
decision in the next step. Finally, demographical data was collected.  
 In the trust game participants first had to estimate the 
percentage of trustworthy trustees who would share the €20 equally 
versus the percentage of trustees who would be untrustworthy and 
keep the entire €20 for themselves. Then they had to take their 
decision as trustors and indicate whether they wanted to keep their 
own €5 or hand over this money to an unknown trustee. Participants 
were told that the decisions of the trustees had already been collected 
and that they would be randomly assigned to a trustee, if they hand 
over their money.  
 In both coin flip settings participants should indicate whether 
they want to bet their money on the flip of a coin. Participants were 
told that the coin flip would take place at the end of the experiment 
no matter how they decided.  
 Furthermore, in all questionnaires participants were asked for 
their subjective beliefs to double their money when going for the risky 
option. These were measured by a 7 point scale (1 = I am totally sure I 
would lose my €5, when I bet (hand over) the money; 7 = I am totally 
sure I would double the €5, when I bet (hand over) the money). 
 All participants were paid immediately after the experiment. 
Through a system of passwords and envelopes neither other 
participants nor experimenters knew how the single participant had 
decided and whether he got money or not.  
4.2.3. Payout for trustees 
  In the last step of the experiment, trustees that were randomly 
assigned to trustors who had handed over their money were paid 
accordingly. To ensure total anonymity, the money was distributed 
through closed envelopes, which were only marked with the personal 
passwords of trustees. Trustees had to indicate their password to get 
  
their envelope. Also the beneficiar
randomly selected from a lecture and paid.
4.3. Results 
House money effects.
former studies repeatedly showed that people express high risk 
tolerance in trust situations although they ar
about the trustworthiness of their interaction partners. Is this a 
stable phenomenon connected to the situation of trust or rather an 
artifact of house money effects? To give an answer to that question 
we introduced a trust game in which
over their own money. Hereby, our first question was whether trutors 
would hand over own money at all. A majority of trustors (57.1%) 
gave away their money to an an
despite the fact that tr
trust rates comparable to those in former studies, where participants 
could hand over the show
2009, 2010a). 
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 Thus, 
 
53.1% 
28,3%
  
(SD = 24.32) of the trustees would give back money. As Figure 2 
shows, this was significantly less (
actual share (72.4%). In a nutshell, participants were not able to 
recognize how trustworthy others are in reality, a
realization was hi
Figure 2: Estimations of trustworthiness of trustees in the trust game in 
comparison to the actual behavior of trustees
Note: *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
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chance of winning with 3.56 (SD=1.01) on the 7 point scale (see 
Figure 3). A t-test showed that this value did not significantly differ 
(t(195) = -.15 n.s.) from the average belief of being assigned to a 
trustworthy trustee in the trust game (3.53). Thus, participants 
estimated and perceived the risk in the trust game similar to that one 
in the coin flips. 
Figure 3: Subjective beliefs about the chance of doubling money in the trust 
game, the ordinary coin flip and the extended coin flip 
 
 Contradicting the hypothesis that trustors bet their money in 
the trust game because they were generally risk seeking, we found 
significantly fewer participants that bet money in the coin flip (25.3%) 
than trustors that handed over money in the trust game (53.1%), χ2 
(1, n = 197) = 20.69, p < .01. Indeed, the relationship between the 
estimated trustworthiness and the decision to hand over money was 
rather weak in the trust game, (r(98) = .24, p < .05). 
 Preferences for equality. We also used the results from the 
last section to shed light on the question whether trustors handed 
over money because they had a preference for equality. Preferences 
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trust game led inevitably to unequal pay-offs. However, contradicting 
preferences for equality, as shown above, significantly fewer not more 
participants bet money in the coin flip than trustors handed over 
money in the trust game. 
 Enlarging the pie. Did trustors hand over money in the trust 
game because they wanted to enlarge the pie? To give an answer to 
this question we introduced the extended coin flip. Similar to the 
trust game, here, also another person benefited from the decision to 
go for the risky option. Thus, the extended coin flip was introduced 
as a risky decision void of trust, but involving social dependency. For 
the same reason why the coin flip was comparable to the trust game 
regarding the perceived chance of winning, the extended coin flip was, 
too. Again this was also reflected in subjective beliefs. On average 
participants estimated their subjective chance of winning with 3.55 
(SD=1.05) on the 7 point scale. A t-test showed that these 3.55 did 
not significantly differ (t(195) = -.09, n.s.) from those in the trust 
game (3.53).  
 Although, the extended coin flip was comparable to the trust 
game in matters of perceived risk and payoffs, significantly fewer 
participants bet money in the extended coin flip (28.3%) than trustors 
handed over money in the trust game (53.1%), χ2 (1, n = 197) = 16.77, 
p < .01. This finding strongly contradicted the possibility that high 
trust rates were caused by the motive to enlarge the pie only. 
 However, to test whether people were partly influenced by the 
motive to enlarge the pie, we had to compare the extended coin flip 
with the ordinary coin flip. Both paradigms only differed in the fact 
that in the extended coin flip a second person was benefitting when 
the participant bet his money. Thus, even a weak motive for enlarging 
the pie should have motivated more participants to bet money in the 
extended than in the ordinary coin flip. However, with 28.3% only 
slightly more participants bet money in the extended coin flip than in 
the ordinary one in which 25.3% bet their money. This difference was 
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not significant, (χ2 (1, n = 198) = .23, n.s.). That means, we could not 
find any evidence for the suggestion that participants cared about the 
fact that in the extended coin flip the pie was enlarged when betting 
money. 
4.4. Discussion 
 Which insight can be derived from this study, concerning the 
explanation of trust behavior in anonymous one-shot interactions 
and the phenomenon of trust in general? First, we can state that high 
trust rates in trust games are a very robust phenomenon and, second, 
we showed that these high trust rates can hardly be explained by the 
most common arguments the current literature provides. Beginning 
with the robustness of high trust, our study did not only replicate 
high trust rates but showed that they are replicable under very 
conservative and realistic conditions. 
 Past studies concerning explanations for high rates of risky 
decisions in trust situations often applied a design where participants 
could take continuous decisions (Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006; 
Cox, 2004; Berg et al., 1995). But in real life trust decisions are often 
dichotomous. You cannot decide to buy just a half of a camera on 
ebay, because you do not really trust the seller and in the same way 
you have to unrestrainedly trust the babysitter who should look after 
your children. That is why the binary choice design we applied in all 
settings should be closer to reality than former studies. 
 Additionally, participants in all settings made their decisions 
for real money, and, since no show-up fee was paid, had to use their 
own money. In our opinion it cannot be stressed enough that 
participants, who gave money away, not only ran the risk to take the 
time to come to our lab, spend about 45 minutes there and go home 
with no money, but to go home with €5 less than before. We think 
there is hardly any possibility to design more serious decisions for 
the participants. 
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 Furthermore, in this study we examined a quite big sample size 
for every treatment to obtain robust results. We simultaneously 
controlled for alternative explanations in a strict between-subjects 
design in which every participant was only confronted with one 
decision in one paradigm without knowing about other paradigms.  
 Against this background, it is even more striking that we found 
not only a substantial amount of trustors, who handed over their 
money (57.1%), but also that rates of trust seem to be not different 
from these in past works (56.3% and 56.8%), where participants got 
money from the experimenter (e.g. Fetchenhauer and Dunning 2009, 
2010a). Thus, our findings strongly suggest that behavior in trust 
games is not explainable by house money effects or by a lack of 
seriousness regarding participants’ decisions.  
 We also could not find any evidence that other explanations we 
had tested can account for high trust rates. In line with past works, 
trustors were not able to anticipate the high level of trustworthiness 
of their interaction partners. Whereas trustors estimated that only 
53.1% of trustees would be trustworthy, actually 72.4% proved to be. 
To find out whether trustors are just risk seeking, we introduced the 
ordinary coin flip as a simple measure of risk aversion. Since the 
perceived chance of doubling the money (53.1%) was not significantly 
different from the actual chance in the coin flips (50%), we were able 
to compare them. That only 25.3% of the participants bet their money 
in the coin flip showed that participants in general were rather risk-
averse than risk seeking, given an analogous pattern of chances and 
outcomes. This result is frequently found in the literature and can be 
explained by the prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Obviously, a high level of risk tolerance cannot explain high trust 
rates in the trust game. 
 In addition, people are not only risk averse, they are also 
ambiguity averse; that can be shown e.g. in the Ellsberg paradox 
(Ellsberg, 1961). Ambiguity aversion means that people prefer known 
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risks to unknown. Taking ambiguity aversion into account, even 
fewer participants should have handed over their money in the trust 
game (unknown risk) compared to the ordinary coin flip (known risk 
of 50%). From this perspective the fact that we found indeed double 
as high rates of risky decisions in the trust game underlines the 
strength of the phenomenon.  
 We could not find any indications that this difference was 
triggered by norms of distributive justice. If people had cared about 
equal distributions that were only achievable by keeping the money 
in the trust game, we should have found even lower rates of risky 
decisions in the trust game than in the coin flip. Thus, our data 
contradict the idea that high trust rates are caused by a preference 
for equal distributions. 
 The extended coin flip controlled for whether participants 
wanted to enlarge the pie. Our results showed that participants risk 
tolerance was significantly lower in the extended coin flip than in the 
trust game. Moreover, the percentage of risky choices in the extended 
coin flip was not even significantly higher than in the ordinary coin 
flip. Based on our finding, we have to conclude that norms of 
distributive justice cannot contribute to clarify the phenomenon of 
trust at all. 
 So far, the question why people trust is still a puzzle. However, 
in this study we have shown that a variety of common explanations –
based on the rational approach to trust– can hardly contribute to 
unravel it. However, when a rational approach fails to explain trust 
behavior which approach is suitable?  
 Dunning and Fetchenhauer (2010) suggested that trust 
behavior is an expressive act rather than being based on 
consequential and instrumental considerations as the rational 
approach claims. They argueed that one should focus on the 
immediate rewards and goals the act of trusting itself entails to 
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understand trust behavior. This reasoning is based on two 
phenomena they have observed in different studies.  
 First, Schlösser et al. (2010) showed that emotions rather than 
expectations about future gains influence the decision to trust. Even 
more interesting is that in this study participants were influenced by 
their immediate emotions they had in the moment they decided to 
trust or distrust. However, the consequential approach would predict 
that participants should be first and foremost influenced by 
anticipated emotions. Anticipated emotions are predictions by the 
participants about how they would feel after each possible decision 
they can make and outcomes associated with it. Contradicting the 
consequential approach, anticipated emotions failed to predict trust. 
 Second, Dunning and Fetchenhaur (2010) found out that a 
minimal relation between trustor and trustee is a necessary 
prerequisite for high trust rates. Hereby, it was enough to tell 
trustors that a specific, but anonymous, person is already assigned 
to them as a trustee to trigger high trust rates. If, in contrast, 
trustors were told that they are not assigned to a specific trustee, 
trust rates dropped substantially. Dunning and Fetchenhauer argued 
that being placed in a relationship – even this relationship is 
minimal– can trigger expressive concerns instead of consequential 
ones.  
 Dunning and Fetchenhauer (2010) concluded that high trust 
rates might be based on norms that trustors hold and which are 
evolved to sustain harmony in complex societies in which interactions 
with strangers are frequent. Thus, trustors that hand over money in 
a trust game may be concerned about being nice rather than about 
the monetary outcomes of their decision. However, to this point it is 
unclear if trustors comply with a specific norm and what kind of 
norm that could be. Furthermore, trustors could be influenced by 
other expressive motives like perceiving oneself as someone virtuous 
who his trustworthy - even to strangers. 
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 We recommend that further research should focus on 
expressive features of trust. This study, as well as earlier studies 
showed that already thoroughly examined consequential explanations 
for trust consecutively fail to account for that phenomenon. In 
contrast, the expressive approach, on which little research has been 
made to date, seems more fruitful to explain trust behavior. 
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5. Do people trust at any cost? 
5.1. Introduction 
When researchers analyze trust they typically bear social 
dilemma situations in their mind in which two interaction partners 
can be better off when one of them (trustor) trusts and the other 
(trustee) proves trustworthy (Coleman, 1990). The social dilemma in 
these situations arises from the fact that trustees can exploit the 
trustors by keeping the whole surplus of the interaction for 
themselves. Therefore, trustees have to decide between being 
reciprocal or selfish and trustors between a potential gain, with the 
risk of being exploited and no gain.  
 Situations like this can be frequently found in everyday life and 
business. One example is the second-hand car market. Both seller 
and buyer are better off, if a car is sold because the buyer values the 
car higher than the money he has to pay and the seller the money 
higher than the car. However, sellers have an incentive to conceal not 
directly obvious flaws of the car and, thus, buyers have to trust the 
seller that the car is not a lemon. 
However, not long ago one author of this study became firmly 
aware that these are not the only kind of trust situations existing. He 
was ambling along the river Rhine when a neatly dressed man 
approached him. The man was desperate. He told our colleague that 
he had been on the way to a customer with his truck, however, he 
had lost his way and eventually had run out of fuel with no penny to 
his name. Our dear coauthor was in an awkward situation. Should 
he lend this stranger some money? 
 Undoubtedly, our coauthor was confronted with a trust 
situation but in difference to the first example he could not profit 
from being trustful. Thus, in the first example trust could be based 
on strategic considerations but not in the second one. Situations like 
this are void of the strategic element for trustors to be better off. 
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Other examples are donating to charity organizations or picking up 
hitchhikers. In these situations we cannot be better off but have to 
trust that the charity organization will not embezzle our money and 
that the hitchhiker will not rob us. Even though, such non-strategic 
trust situations seem to be quite present in everyday life, they have 
not, to the best of our knowledge, examined yet. Therefore, the 
purpose of this paper is to examine such non-strategic trust 
situations for the first time. 
5.1.1. How to measure trust 
  When analyzing the phenomenon trust, the trust game is often 
used (Berg et al., 1995; Eckel & Wilson, 2000, 2004; Fetchenhauer & 
Dunning, 2009). In a binary variation of the trust game –also applied 
in this study– a trustor and a trustee are involved, who are 
interacting anonymously via an experimenter. The trustor receives a 
certain amount of money (f.i. €5) and has an opportunity to keep all 
the money or to hand it over entirely to the trustee. If the trustor 
hands over the money (€5) to the trustee, the experimenter multiplies 
this amount (here by 4) and hands it over to the trustee. Then the 
trustee has an opportunity to keep this increased amount (here €20), 
or to reciprocate by giving back half of it (here €10) to the trustor. 
5.1.2. Trust Behavior  
 A rational and selfish trustee, who maximizes his own payoffs, 
should keep all money for himself in the trust game because he has 
no incentive to share money and cannot be punished for his egoistic 
behavior. In line with the common knowledge assumption, which 
claims that each participant knows the “best” strategy in a decision 
scenario as well as that each participant knows that every other 
participant knows the best strategy etc. (Aumann & Brandenburger, 
1995), trustors can anticipate the behavior of trustees and, thus, 
should not hand over any money. However, empirically it can be 
shown that most trustees behave trustworthy in that game and about 
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50% percent of trustors hand over money to trustees. (Berg et al., 
1995, Eckel & Wilson, 2000, 2004; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009, 
2010a, 2010b).  
5.1.3. Is trust strategic?  
 Do people trust strategically and hand over money in the trust 
game because they anticipate getting more money back? Findings of 
the current literature deny such reasoning. First, trustors usually 
underestimate the trustworthiness of trustees by about 30-35 
percentage points (Fetchenhauer and Dunning 2009, 2010a). Second, 
various studies showed that high trust rates cannot be explained by 
high risk tolerance (Eckel & Wilson, 2000; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 
2009, 2010b; Houser et al., 2010) Fetchenhauer and Dunning 
(2010b) explained these findings with a phenomenon that we call 
distrust aversion here (see also Dunning and Fetchenhauer, 2010). 
They argued that emotions rather than rational considerations could 
explain trust behavior. Accordingly, people feel bad when signaling 
distrust openly, but feel good when trusting. 
  The influence of strategic motives on trust has not been tested 
directly hitherto. We provide such a direct test in this study by 
comparing an ordinary trust game to a non strategic trust game, 
which we designed particularly for this study. The ordinary trust 
game was similar to the trust game described above except the fact 
that trustors did not get a show-up fee that they could hand over to a 
trustee but could only hand over their own money. 
  In the non strategic trust game, trustors again could decide to 
hand over own €5 to a trustee or to keep that money. However, if they 
handed it over, the experimenter did not quadruple the money, but 
only doubled it and handed in total €10 to the trustee. The trustee 
had then the opportunity to keep all the €10 for himself or to share 
that money equally with the trustor. Regarding our examples in the 
introduction, this setting resembled real live situations like picking 
up hitchhikers or donating money to a charity organization. If people 
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only trust because they expect to be eventually better off by trusting, 
people should not trust in non-strategic trust situations. However, if 
people feel bad by showing others distrust, as argued by 
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2010b), still substantial trust rates 
should emerge in non-strategic trust situations.  
 Finally, we go one step further and explore how far distrust 
aversion (if existing) can push people to risk being worse off, than 
before. In non strategic trust situations people can easily rationalize 
their decision to trust by telling themselves that they will break even 
when trusting. To give no room for such rationalizing, we introduced 
a trust game in which trustors could only be worse off when trusting 
another person. Still trustors had the opportunity to keep or hand 
over own €5 in this setting. However, in contrast to the ordinary as 
well as non strategic trust game this money was not increased, if 
handed over to the trustee. Trustees that received €5 could decide to 
keep all €5 or to give back €2.5 to the trustor. In this paradigm it was 
explicitly spelt out to trustors that their trust would entail costs, 
namely €2.5 in the best and €5 in the worst case. Moreover, the fact 
that trustors could only hand over their own money, they brought to 
the experiment, should have made the costly nature of this trust 
game particularly salient for them. This trust game was not 
introduced to resemble real life situations, but to prove our argument. 
Only if people are strongly distrust averse, we should find people who 
still trusted in this very extreme trust situation.  
 Both situations will give us also a more thorough 
understanding of how participants react on changes of potential 
gains in trust situations. Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2010b) showed 
that people react sensitively on risk in ordinary risk situations but 
quite insensitively in trust situations. We want to examine here 
whether people react to changes in potential gains in trust situations 
as insensitive as on changes in risk. 
 55 
 
 
 Apart from the behavior in non strategic trust games we also 
want to explore whether the estimations of trustors about the 
number of trustworthy trustees change with changes in potential 
gains.  
 To be sure that the trust rates in all trust games were due to 
the special features of a trust situation, we assigned each trust game 
one lottery equal in risks and potential gains. That means that we 
also had to introduce lotteries in which participants could not win 
money (just got their own stakes back in the case of “winning”) or 
even only lose own money. We expect to find that only very few 
participants bet money in lotteries that entailed no gains, and no 
participants that bet money in lotteries with negative outcomes. 
 We want to stress that in all games we applied in this study, 
participants made their decisions for own money and not for a show-
up fee like in former studies entailing trust games or lotteries. We did 
that because past studies showed that participants behave more 
risky with money just handed to them since participants consider 
such money as house money (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Weber and 
Zuchel, 2001). Our design did not only rule out house money effects, 
but also made the decisions of participants much more realistic. In 
addition, our design provides a much more conservative test of our 
hypotheses for two reasons. First, it should feel much worse to lose 
own money than a show-up fee. Second, if participants receive a 
show-up fee, they could feel coerced to hand over this money. They 
may assume that the experimenter has given them the show-up fee 
for the purpose to take part in the trust game and might behave in 
accordance to the presumed social desired way. If, in contrast, 
participants have to hand over their own money they should not feel 
obliged in any way to hand over money. 
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5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Participants  
 In total, 561 students of the University of Cologne participated 
in this study. Of these, 135 were excluded from the analyses because 
they did not complete the questionnaire, failed to answer the control 
questions correctly, or were assigned to participants with incomplete 
questionnaires or incorrectly answered questions. Of the remaining 
426 participants, 246 were female and 180 were male. 
5.2.2. Procedure  
 The experiment was divided in three steps. In the first step, 189 
students of the University of Cologne from 4 different lectures filled 
out questionnaires. The randomly distributed questionnaires 
contained one of 3 variations of a trust game in which a trustor could 
hand over his own €5 to a trustee. Trust games varied in the factor 
(k) that determined how many times the €5 were multiplied by the 
experimenter, if trustors handed over the money to the trustee. 
Participants were confronted with games implying k-factors of 4, 2 
and 1. Accordingly, in these games trustees could keep or share 
equally €20, €10 or €5 resp. when trusted by trustors. Then 
participants’ understanding was checked via 4 control questions. 
Finally, participants should make a decision as the trustee and 
indicate whether they would keep €20 (€10, €5) or give €10 (€5, €2.5) 
back, if they got money from a trustor. Participants were informed 
that they would be randomly assigned to an anonymous trustor, who 
would make his decision within the next weeks. Thus, their decision 
became real when their assigned trustor handed over money. 
Participants were assured that they would get their money in 4 weeks. 
To ensure anonymity all participants were only identified by a 
personal password. 
 In the second step we conducted the main experiment featuring 
a 3 (k-factor 1 vs. 2 vs. 4) x 2 (trust game vs. lottery) factor between-
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subjects design. 372 participants were recruited at the campus of the 
University of Cologne. They were told to bring €5 along that they 
could use for a monetary decision. In the lab, groups of 3-12 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. 
Participants were seated in booths and had to fill out questionnaires 
in which we emphasized that they can but do not have to bet their 
own €5 in a subsequent decision. Again, a personal password 
assured anonymity. 
 Participants who were assigned to a trust game faced one of the 
3 trust games with k-factors of 1, 2 or 4, respectively. Again, first the 
paradigm was introduced followed by control questions. Then 
participants should estimate which percentage of people would share 
money in the position of the trustee as well as which percentage 
would keep all money for themselves. Participants were reminded 
that both percentages must add up to 100%. The estimated 
percentage of trustworthy trustees can be interpreted as the trustor’s 
believed chance to get money back from the trustee. Hereafter, they 
were informed that they would now make a decision as the trustor 
and that the decisions of the trustees had been already collected. 
Participants were explained that they would be randomly assigned to 
one trustee and immediately given any returns from the trustee, in 
the case they would hand over their own €5. Trustors assigned to an 
untrustworthy trustee always lost their money. However, trustors 
assigned to a trustworthy trustee handed over €5 and got €10 back 
(net gain €5) in the k=4, €5 (net gain €0) in the k=2 and €2.5 in the 
k=1 (net loss €2.5) condition. Before they made their decision to keep 
or to give their money away they had been asked for their subjective 
beliefs to be matched with a trustworthy trustee. Subjective beliefs 
were measured through a 7 point scale (1 = I am totally sure I would 
be assigned to a person that gives me €0 back, when I handed over my 
€5, 7 = I am totally sure I would be assigned to a person that gives me 
€2.5/€5/€10 back, when I handed over my €5).  
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 In the lottery conditions, participants could bet their own €5 on 
the throw of two ten-sided dice of which one was black and the other 
one white. Participants were explained that at the end of the session 
the dice would be thrown whereby the dice would assemble a number 
between 1 and 100. Hereby, the black dice generated the ten’s (first 
digit) and the white dice the unit (second digit). The combination 00 
counted as 100. Furthermore, each participant received a personal 
winning number between 0 and 100 determining their chance to win 
the lottery. They won the lottery, if a number smaller or equal to their 
personal winning number was thrown. They lost the lottery, if a 
number higher than their winning number was thrown. A participant 
that had f.i. the winning number of 76 won the lottery, if the dice 
showed any number between 1 and 76 and lost the lottery, if the dice 
showed any number between 77 and 100. To determine the winning 
numbers we randomly assigned each lottery to one trust game that 
was conducted beforehand. The winning number for each lottery was 
then determined by the estimated percentage of trustworthy trustees 
that was indicated by the trustor of the assigned trust game. With 
this procedure we ensured that for each trust game an equally risky 
lottery was conducted. Also the stakes of each lottery were fitted to 
the assigned trust game. Like in the trust games, participants in all 
lotteries lost their €5, if they lost the dice throw. However, if they won, 
their gain was dependent on the k-factor of the trust game they were 
matched with. In lotteries matched with k=4 trust games, 
participants got €10 back from their €5 (net gain = €5), if they won. 
Lotteries matched with k=2 trust games yielded €5 (net gain = €0) in 
the case of winning and lotteries matched with k=1 trust games €2.5 
(net loss €2.5).  
 Analogous to trust games, first the paradigm of the lotteries 
was introduced to participants followed by control questions. Then 
they should indicate their subjective beliefs to win their lottery on the 
same 7-point scale applied in the trust game. Hereafter, participants 
made their decisions.  
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 In both paradigms, the trust game and lottery, participants 
were immediately paid after the experiment. Through a system of 
passwords and envelopes neither other participants nor 
experimenters knew how the single participant decided or whether 
money was returned or not.  
 In the last step of the experiment, trustees were paid that had 
been randomly assigned to a trustor that had handed over his money. 
The money was distributed in closed envelopes, which were only 
marked with the personal passwords of trustees, to ensure total 
anonymity. Trustees had to indicate their password to get their 
envelope. 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Number of Risky Decisions in Trust Games and Lotteries  
 The main question of our study was whether people trust 
strategically or not. We pointed out that we should not find any 
participants that trusted in the k=1 or k=2 condition, if our 
participants’ decisions were based on strategic considerations only. 
We also introduced a coin flip as a risky decision void of trust, in 
order to attribute potential trust rates in all trust games to the 
special features of a trust situation. Figure 4 summarizes our 
findings. 
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Figure 4: Percentages of risky choices in trust games and in the lotteries 
 
At a first it is eye-catching that overall more trustors went for 
the risky option than participants in the lotteries as well as that risky 
options in both setting decreased with decreasing k-faktors. A logistic 
regression with the decision to bet/hand over money as the 
dependent variable and the k-factor as well as the kind of game as 
independent variables could support this impression. The main effect 
of the paradigm (OR = .3, p < .01) as well as the k-factor (p < .01) was 
significant (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Summary of binary-logistic regression with the trust game and k=1 as 
reference category 
 
Note: Significant effect on the decision to bet money: *p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 
Explained pseudo variance: Nagelkerke’s R² = .31  
 
Considering the single conditions we found that in the coin flip 
19 participants (42.2%) bet their money when they could double their 
stakes (k=4). However, only 8 people (17%) bet money in the k=2 
condition, in which they could only get their stakes back, and only 1 
participant (2%) bet money in the k=1 condition, in which 
participants could only lose money. In the trust game people behaved 
quite differently. Contradicting a strategic motivation of trustors, we 
observed not only high risk rates in the k=4 condition (32 
participants or 71.1%) but also in the non strategic conditions, k=2 
(22 or 46.8%) and even k=1 (13 or 26%) condition. Table 2 shows that 
in each k condition the number of risky choices was significantly 
higher to a 1% α-level in the trust games than in the lotteries. 
 
 
Model B SE Wald OR  
Lottery -1.21 .45 7.4***  .3  
k-factors 
k=1 
k=2 
k*Paradigm 
k=1 by Paradigm 
k=2 by Paradigm 
 
-1.95 
-1.03 
 
-1.63 
-.24 
 
.46 
.44 
 
1.15 
.66 
17.88*** 
17.87*** 
5.46** 
2.01 
2.01 
.13 
  
.14 
.36 
 
.2 
.79 
 
 
 
Constant .9 .33  7.5*** 2.46       
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Table 2: Overview of significant differences of risky decisions in the trust 
game and lotteries 
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The findings of the last paragraph showed that the level of risk 
tolerance was higher in the trust games than in the equivalent 
lotteries independent of the k-factor. However, in the introduction we 
pointed out that it is possible to find not only higher levels of risk 
taking in trust situations than in ordinary risk situations but also a 
higher insensitivity to changes in potential gains. A quick look at the 
pure descriptive statistics in the paragraph above shows that risky 
choices declined by 15 to 20 percentage points in both, the trust 
game and the lottery for each reduction of the k-factor (4, 2, 1). 
Hence, we assumed that the k-factor influenced trust rates as well as 
gambling behavior to the same extend. Our logistic regression with 
the decision to bet/hand over money as the dependent variable and 
the k-factor as well as the kind of game as independent variables 
could confirm that impression. We found a significant (p < .01) main 
effect for the k-factor but no interaction effect of k-factor and 
paradigm (see Table 1). 
5.3.2. Trustworthiness estimations  
 Former studies showed that most of the trustees were 
trustworthy in trust games and gave money back when they received 
some from the trustor. However, it was also shown that trustors were 
unable to anticipate that high percentage of trustworthiness. We 
wanted to find out whether this pattern holds true for non strategic 
trust games. Beginning with the behavior of the trustees, Figure 5 
shows that between 68.9% and 76.6% of the trustees were 
trustworthy in our study. 
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Figure 5: Trustors' estimations of trustworthy trustees in the trust game in 
comparison to the actual behavior of trustees 
 
Note: *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
 A chi-square test revealed that the decision to be trustworthy 
was not significantly influenced by the k-factor (χ2 (2, n = 142) = .65, 
n.s.). Thus, most of trustees gave money back when they received 
some from the trustor -no matter whether they participated in a 
strategic trust game or not. An ANOVA revealed that also trustors’ 
estimations did not differ significantly F(2,139) = .21, n.s. However, 
trustors strongly underestimated the trustworthiness of trustees 
overall (t(141) = -10.67, p < .01) as well as in each single k-condition 
strongly (see Figure 5). This means, independent of the kind of trust 
situation trustors were facing, they were unable to anticipate how 
trustworthy their partners of interaction usually were. 
5.3.3. Subjective beliefs of trustors and participants of lotteries 
 Through our design, trustors and participants in lotteries faced 
the same risks by handing over money and betting money 
respectively. However, participants might have been more risk 
tolerant in the trust games because the trust situations felt less risky 
54,1%
51,1% 51,9%
76,0% 76,6%
68,9%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
K = 1 K = 2 k = 4
Estimated 
trustworthiness 
of trustees
Actual 
trustworthiness 
of trustees
 65 
 
 
than lotteries. To shed light on this question we analyzed the 
subjective beliefs of doubling the money in the trust games as well as 
the coin flips. Participants attending the trust game indicated on 
average 3.87 (SD = 1.43) points on the subjective belief scale (1 = 
totally sure to lose the money when handing it over; 7 = totally sure to 
double the money when handing it over). This is almost the same 
value participants in the lottery indicated on average (3.81; SD = 
1.48) and both numbers did not differ significantly, t(280) = -.37, n.s. 
5.4. Discussion 
 Do people trust strategically? The answer is yes, but only partly. 
Admittedly, we could find a systematical influence of potential gains 
on the decision to trust. Whereas in the lotteries the amount of risky 
decisions decreased with lower gains to almost zero, trust rates were 
not as vulnerable to changes in expected gains. Even when people 
could only be worse off by trusting (k=1) a substantial amount of 
trustors (26%) handed over money. This percentage as well as the 
46.8% of trustors who handed over money in the k=2 trust game 
cannot be explained by strategic motives. These main results are even 
more striking when taking a closer look at the other results as well as 
the design of our experiment. 
 First, participants who handed over money in the trust game 
were more than aware of their risk of losing money. In fact, they 
underestimated the trustworthiness of trustees by over 20 percentage 
points independent of the k-factor and, thereby, overestimated their 
risk to lose money. That means although trustors overestimated the 
chance of losing their money in the non-strategic trust games they 
handed it over. 
 Second, participants also did not perceive the estimated risks 
in the trust games and the objective risks in the lotteries differently. 
Trustors did not hand over money because they perceived trust 
games less risky than lotteries. In fact, there was no difference in the 
subjective beliefs of winning between trustors and lottery players. 
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 Third, participants played the games with their own money in 
all paradigms. Thus, the potential costs of trust were as real as 
possible in our experiment and high trust rates cannot be explained 
by house money effects. 
 Fourth, trustors did not only bear real monetary costs. Before 
they could make their decision they had had to come to our lab and 
read questionnaires for about half an hour there. Even so, no trustor 
got upset by spending time for nothing. Contrary, a substantial rate 
of participants decided at the end of the experiment to make 
themselves dependent on a totally unknown second person while 
knowing that they can only lose money by this decision. 
One might argue here that participants, who handed over their 
money, did not do this in spite of the non-monetary costs they had 
already borne before they could make their decision, but exactly 
because by bearing all these costs. Following that logic participants 
made a sense of all costs they incurred by convincing themselves that 
they were actually very happy to take part in this interesting 
experiment. However, to convince themselves properly, they had to 
hand over money. Indeed such self justifying behavior to reduce 
cognitive dissonance could be shown frequently in past studies (e.g. 
Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Kiesler, Nisbett, & Zanna, 1969). 
However, we can definitely refute this possibility. If high trust rates in 
the trust game were a mere dissonance phenomenon, we should have 
found same rates of risky decisions in the lotteries.  
 Fifth, the non strategic trust examples from everyday life, 
explained in the introduction, involved trustees in need (trucker out 
of fuel, donations). Participants in our lab even accepted costs for 
trusting a person not in need but in the very comfortable position to 
decide whether to take just half of the money or all of it. 
 Finally, people are ordinarily ambiguity avers (Ellsberg, 1961) 
and prefer known risks over unknown ones. Hence, we should have 
found risky choices in the lotteries in which the chances of winning 
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were precisely determined rather than in the trust games in which 
the risks were only guessed by trustors themselves.  
 In conclusion, our results showed, in line with past works, that 
people hardly trust on the base of rational considerations. Trust 
behavior differs from risk behavior and people even accept notable 
costs to avoid showing distrust towards others. Our examples in the 
introduction suggest that this likely holds true outside the lab. By the 
way, our coauthor that lent the needy trucker €50, has never seen 
back any of it. 
 The question remains, why people react insensitively on 
changes of risk in trust games (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010b), 
but strongly on changes of mutual gains. One possible explanation is 
that the costly nature of a trust game is much more obvious for 
participants when the negative expected outcome of this trust game 
is accomplished through low potential gains than through a low 
chance of winning. In a trust game, in which a trustor can double his 
money with a chance of 40% and lose it with one of 60%, the 
expected outcome is negative, nevertheless he can still hope to double 
his money. In contrast, such hope is non-existent in a trust game in 
which a trustor can break even in the best case or lose it in the worst 
case. Based on the research of Dunning and Fetchenhauer (2010) we 
strongly assume that the variation of behavior with different styles of 
trust games, as well as the difference in behavior between trust 
games and ordinary risk decisions, is due to different emotions actors 
have in the moment they decide. Furthermore, we suggest that these 
emotions are at least partly based on how risk and trust situations 
are perceived. The awareness of potential gains and risks could play 
an important part here. Further studies, featuring a similar design to 
this study, but examining a larger variety of gain and risk 
combinations, as well as the emotions of people who decide in 
lotteries or trust games, could make a substantial contribution to the 
explanation of trust. 
 68 
 
 
6. More nosy than regret averse? – Can curiosity 
explain high risk tolerance in trust games? 
 
“The first and simplest emotion which we discover in the human 
mind, is curiosity” 
(Edmund Burke, 1729 – 1797) 
6.1. Introduction 
 Everyone deals with trust situations every day. We have to 
trust our romantic partner that he is faithful, our friends that they 
are there for us when we need them and our colleagues that they will 
stick to settled agreements. However, trust becomes even more 
important when we interact with unknown persons on one occasion 
only. When our partner, friends or colleagues are untrustworthy, they 
run the risk never to be trusted again and accordingly not to benefit 
from our trust relationship anymore. A car dealer or private seller on 
ebay has much less inhibitions to betray us, because he will 
presumably not interact with us again. However, these people at least 
risk their good reputation, too. On ebay f.i. we can rate sellers. 
In contrast, when researchers examine trust experimentally, 
they mostly examine pure trust (Berg et al., 1995; Eckel & Wilson, 
2000, 2004; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009). They design situations 
in which participants interact anonymously and untrustworthy 
persons cannot be held accountable for their behavior by any means. 
A puzzling -and yet unexplained- finding of this research is that 
people are highly trustful in such situations. They rather hand over 
money to a stranger with the hope that this person will reward them 
for their trust than betting this money in a comparable lottery. Even 
more puzzling, they trust, although they underestimate the 
trustworthiness of their potential interaction partners crucially 
(Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009, 2010a).  
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In this study we want to find out whether people trust in such 
pure trust situations because they are curious. In the situations 
described above, people (trustors) that can trust another person 
(trustee), can only find out whether this person was trustworthy or 
not by trusting him or her. Thus, trustors might have behaved 
trustfully in past studies because they were just curious about how 
another person behaves in such a pure trust decision – information 
that they cannot capture in everyday life. Before we consider this 
curiosity hypothesis more thoroughly, the next section gives an 
overview about the current trust research and which explanations 
failed to account for high trust rats in the past.  
6.1.1. Current Trust Research 
The trust Game. Studies that examine trust experimentally 
often make use of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995; Eckel & Wilson, 
2000, 2004; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009). In a binary variation of 
that game a trustor and a trustee are involved, who are interacting 
anonymously via an experimenter. The trustors can decide to keep or 
hand over €5 to the trustee. If the trustor gives the money to the 
trustee, the experimenter quadruples the €5 so that the trustee 
receives €20 in total. Then the trustee has the choice to either keep 
the whole amount, or to reciprocate by sharing the €20 equally with 
the trustor. 
The trust game was developed to test game theoretical 
predictions based on the idea of the homo oeconomicus that is a 
construct of economic theory. According to the homo oeconomicus, 
people only maximize their own pay offs because they are rational 
and egoistic (Persky, 1995). Following this idea, no trustee who 
receives money in a trust game should give money back to a trustor. 
An additional idea of economic theory is the common knowledge 
assumption, which assumes that every rational actor knows about 
the best strategy of every other actor (Aumann & Brandenburger, 
1995). Therefore, trustors should be able to anticipate the behavior of 
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the trustee and, hence, should not hand over any money to the 
trustee.  
In contrast to economic theory, a variety of studies has shown 
that 40%-95% of trustors hand over money in the trust game as well 
as that most trustees (70%-90%) prove trustworthy and give money 
back (Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009; 
McCabe et al., 2003). The current literature fails to explain why so 
many trustors hand over money - although a lot of explanations have 
been tested. The following paragraphs shall give an overview. 
Explanations for high trust rates. When we consider the 
behavior of the trustors only, it is not immediately obvious that 
trustors behave in contradiction to economic theory. One could argue 
that only trustees behave irrationally because most of them give 
money back when entrusted by a trustor. However, trustors could 
anticipate these high rates of trustworthy trustees and would hand 
over money since they might expect to get more money back in return. 
Indeed trustors face quite good odds and have a 70-90% chance of 
doubling their money in the trust game.  
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009, 2010a) have pointed out 
that this argumentation is an artifact of a narrow concept of trust 
that had been used in past studies. This concept claimed that 
trustors hand over money because they consider their interaction 
partner to be trustworthy. Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009, 2010a) 
by contrast have distinguished between the behavioral act of trusting 
and the cognitive believe in the trustworthiness of others. In their 
studies trustors were indeed trustful on the behavioral level, but 
underestimated at the same time the number of trustworthy trustees 
by 30-35% percent points. Thus, trustors estimated that only about 
45-60% would prove trustworthy whereas 70-90% actually did. These 
findings were replicated in this work in Chapter 4 and 5.  
Yet, even if trustors underestimate the trustworthiness of 
trustees in general, the economic and strictly rational approach to 
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explain trust behavior could still be true. It could be that the 
estimated rates of trustworthiness are high enough for trustors to 
hand over money because they are risk seeking.  
However, several studies showed that the understanding of 
trust games as risk situations like lotteries is generally flawed. Eckel 
and Wilson (2004) tried to predict the behavior of participants in a 
trust game by two behavioral risk measures. In their study, they 
could not find a statistical relation between the risky decisions and 
the decision to hand over money in the trust game. This result could 
be replicated by Ben-Nur and Halldorsson (2010) as well as Houser et 
al. (2010). Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2010b) designed an 
experiment in which participants could hand over $5 in a binary 
trust game as well as bet $5 in a lottery with the chance to lose or 
double the money (within-subjects). In addition, they manipulated 
between-subjects both the chance to double the money in the trust 
game by telling the trustors which percentage of the potential 
trustees was trustworthy as well as the chance of doubling the money 
in the lottery. In a first condition the chance to double the money was 
46% in both settings and in a second condition 80%. They found 
much higher rates of risky choices in the trust game than in the 
lottery when the chance of winning was 46%. Furthermore, 
participants reacted very sensitively on changes in the chance of 
winning in the lotteries but rather insensitively in the trust games.  
The studies presented suggest that classical economic theory 
assuming rational, egoistic and utility maximizing actors is not 
sufficient to explain trust. In Chapter 4 it was demonstrated that 
trusting behavior is not even explainable by economic theory, when 
these strict assumptions are relaxed. They argued that trustors might 
not only care about themselves when making decisions but also 
about consequences for others. To find out, they compared a binary 
trust game 1) to an ordinary lottery, in which participants faced the 
same potential gains and risks as in the binary trust game and 2) to 
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a lottery void of trust but featuring a second person involved as well 
as same risks and outcomes for both players as in the binary trust 
game. Contradicting preferences for second players, in Chapter 4 it 
was found an equally low risk tolerance in both lottery decisions and 
replicated a substantially higher risk tolerance in the binary trust 
game, which had already been found in earlier studies. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 4 of the work at hand it was examined 
whether the results in trust games could be caused by a 
methodological flaw, the fact that trustors usually hand over given 
money in trust games. Thaler and Johnson (1990) as well as Weber 
and Zuchel (2001) found that people are more risk seeking with such 
house money. My coauthors and I argued in Chapter 4 that in past 
studies trustors possibly had not taken their decisions seriously 
because of house money effects. Hence, in the study presented in 
Chapter 4 participants had to bring their own money, which they 
could hand over in the trust game and did not receive a show-up fee. 
Still the trust rates found in this study were very similar to the trust 
rates found in studies that used house money. 
In summary, the current literature cannot account for high 
trust rates. 
6.1.2. The curiosity hypothesis 
In this paper we want to test a very simple and parsimonious 
explanation for the phenomenon described above. We want to find 
out whether high trust rates are caused by curiosity that not only 
Edmund Burke in the introductory quote but also psychological 
research has described as a fundamental driver of human behavior 
(see Loewenstein (1994) for an overview). 
When we refer to curiosity in this paper, we bear the 
psychological construct of curiosity in our minds, which has to be 
differentiated from the rational and strategic motivation to search for 
information. William James (1950[1890]), one of the first 
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psychologists, described curiosity as a “susceptibility for being 
excited and irritated by the mere novelty of … the environment” (p. 
430). Thus, from a psychological point of view, curiosity is triggered 
by novel stimuli and driven by emotions. Furthermore, curiosity in 
turn functions as a motivational driver to explore and collect 
information about novel stimuli (Jones, 1966; Jones, Wilkinson, & 
Braden, 1961). Hereby, explorative behavior is only based on the urge 
to satisfy the aroused curiosity and not on rational considerations 
about how useful the collected information might be in the future 
(Loewenstein, 1994). 
Like curiosity, a gap of information can also cause a rational 
and strategic motivation to search for information. However, in 
contrast to curiosity a rational search for information is neither based 
on emotions nor an end in itself, but based on the strategic 
consideration that the collected information will be more valuable 
than the costs of searching (Stone, 1992). 
Trust behavior in trust games could be due to both motivations, 
curiosity as well as a rational search for information. Trustors 
experience a gap of information when they decide to keep or hand 
over money to a trustee. Trustors do not know how trustees behave 
in such pure trust decisions which do not appear in everyday life. To 
find out they have to hand over money to the trustee. According to 
the rational information-search perspective, trustors might 
understand the trust game first and foremost as an opportunity to 
buy information. They would “pay” €5 to learn how another person 
behaves in a pure trust situation, in which he or she cannot be held 
accountable in any way for being untrustworthy. Trustors would 
consider this as important information, which can help them in 
future trust decisions. 
If, in contrast, trustors were influenced by curiosity, they would 
hand over money simply because they would have the emotional urge 
to expose themselves to this new and exiting situation.  
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Concluding, both motivations could explain why people rather 
hand over money in a trust game than bet this money in an equally 
risky lottery. In contrast to handing over money in a trust game, 
betting money in a lottery does not provide participants with the 
opportunity to learn something about the world. In addition, in 
lotteries the chance of winning vs. losing money is usually known. In 
Chapter 4 and 5 my coauthors and I compared risk behavior in trust 
games to risk behavior in coin flips. In a coin flip, all participants 
know that the chance of winning this coin flip is 50%. However, in 
the trust game trustors are confronted with an unknown risk: that 
means uncertainty or ambiguity. Participants can merely built 
expectations about the trustworthiness of trustees and, therewith, 
about the chance of doubling their money in the trust game. In 
Chapter 4 and 5 the fact that participants hand over money in trust 
games, although facing unknown risks, was taken as evidence that 
people’s behavior must be strongly influenced by the element of trust 
in risky situations. Hereby, it was referred to the finding that people 
are not only risk, but also uncertainty averse (e.g. Ellsberg, 1961, 
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985). It was argued that uncertainty aversion 
should cause that fewer rather than more participants hand over 
money in a trust game than in a lottery when the estimated, 
uncertain chance of doubling the money in the trust game is as high 
as the certain chance of doubling money in the lottery. However, in 
Chapter 4 and 5 it was ignored that uncertainty aversion and 
curiosity have the same root – a gap of information. 
In the last paragraphs we pointed out that curiosity, as well as 
a rational motivation to search for information could explain high 
trust rates in trust games. However, with regard to the already 
discussed study of Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2010b), the claim 
that trustors hand over money because they are rationally searching 
for information seems unlikely. As described above, in this study 
trustors had been informed about the chance to be matched with a 
trustworthy trustee before they made their decision. Although 
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participants had this information, a larger percentage of them 
handed over money in a trust game than in a lottery with equal risks 
and stakes. This result contradicts that tustors “paid” €5 for the 
information how another person behaves in a pure trust decisions 
because they received the more valid base rate information for free. 
However, the design of this study did not rule out that trustors 
handed over money because they were curious and wanted to expose 
themselves to the situation of the trust game.  A variety of studies 
showed that people often regard base rate information as not useful 
as well as that abstract statistical pieces of information have less 
impact on peoples judgment than more vivid ones (Borgida & Nisbett, 
1977; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Wainberg, Kida, & Smith, 2010). 
Thus, trustors in the study of Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2010b) 
might nonetheless have been curious about the decision of their 
interaction partner, which they only received when they handed over 
their money. 
 Furthermore, in the study of Fetchenhauer and Dunning 
(2010b) the decisions of trustees had already been collected when 
trustors made their decisions. Research on curiosity showed that 
people become particularly curious about information that is “already 
out there in the world” (Loewenstein, 1994; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 
2005). In addition, another study of Loewenstein, Adler, Behrens and 
Gilles (1992) revealed that people become more curios, if they get 
provided with pieces of the entire information (cited in Loewenstein, 
1994). Thus, giving trustors base rate information could make them 
more curious about the decision of their interaction partner rather 
than less curious, although base rate information is more informative 
than interaction partner’s feedback, from a rational point of view. 
Testing our curiosity hypothesis, we applied a very simple 
design in this study featuring a binary trust game under two 
feedback conditions (between-subjects). Between both conditions we 
manipulated the kind of feedback trustors received in a binary trust 
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game about their assigned trustee. In the conditional feedback 
condition, trustor received only feedback about the decision of their 
interaction partner, if they handed over their money to him. In the 
unconditional feedback condition, we had informed trustors before 
they made their decision that they would learn the decision of their 
assigned trustee independently of their decision to keep or to hand 
over money. If trustors generally hand over money in trust games 
because they are curious about the decision of their trustee, we 
should find lower rates of trust in the trust game with unconditional 
than with conditional feedback.  
6.1.3. The regret hypothesis 
In contrast to the curiosity hypothesis it is equally possible that 
not fewer but more trustors hand over money under unconditional 
than under conditional feedback. We expect this finding, if people in 
trust situations are more regret averse than curious.  
Bell (1982) pointed out that the potential experience of regret 
has to be considered in actors’ utility function to get a better 
understanding of actors’ decision in real life. Later, this idea could be 
supported empirically (Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992; Van 
Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2005; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de 
Vries, 1996). In particular it was shown that people make regret-
minimizing choices. 
Applied to the situation of the trust game, trustors might be 
influenced by anticipated regret when they receive conditional 
feedback. They can choose between safe €5 and risky €10. If they 
keep the €5, they will never learn whether they would have doubled 
or lost this money, if they had handed it over to the trustee. Thus, 
they do not run the risk to experience future regret with this decision. 
If they hand over the money, they run the risk to regret this decision 
when they lose their €5. In contrast, under unconditional feedback 
trustors cannot avoid the threat of potential regret no matter whether 
they keep or hand over their money. If they hand over their money, 
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they run the risk to regret this decision when they lose their €5 just 
like in the conditional feedback condition. Trustors that keep their 
money, risk to learn that they would have doubled the money, if they 
had handed it over to the trustee. Thus, if people are rather regret 
averse than curious, we should find that more trustors handed over 
money under unconditional than conditional feedback. 
In order to replicate former findings of high trust rates, as well 
as regret aversion, we also introduced a simple lottery paradigm 
(within-subjects). Participants in each condition should also indicate 
whether they want to bet €5 on the flip of a coin with the chance to 
double or lose this money. Again, in the conditional feedback 
condition, participants only learned whether they won or lost the coin 
flip, if they decided to bet money on it. However, in the unconditional 
feedback condition they were provided with this information 
independently of their decision. 
The coin flip helps us to make sure that we replicate the basic 
phenomenon of higher risk tolerance in trust games than in lotteries. 
Past studies concerning the trust game showed that trustors on 
average estimate that about 50% of trustees will prove trustworthy 
(Fetchenhauer and Dunning 2009, 2010a). Thus, the perceived 
chance of doubling the money in the trust game was comparable to 
the objective chance of doubling the money in the coin flip in these 
studies. On the condition that trust game and coin flip are again 
comparable in matters of perceived risks in this study, we predict to 
find substantially higher rates of risky trust game choices than 
lottery choices in the conditional feedback condition. 
Furthermore, we expect to find differently high rates of risky 
coin flip decisions between both feedback conditions caused by regret 
aversion. We assume that participants are not curious about the 
outcome of the lottery because they cannot learn anything from this 
information. However, participants should be influenced by regret 
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aversion. Thus, we expect to observe higher rates of risky lottery 
decisions under unconditional feedback than under conditional one. 
6.2. Method 
6.2.1. Participants 
Participants were 182 students from the University of Cologne. 
We excluded 18 participants from the analysis because of incomplete 
questionnaires or wrong control questions. The 164 participants left 
in the sample (105 female) were on average 23.66 (SD = 3.41) years 
old. 
6.2.2. Procedure  
 The experiment was divided into two steps. In step one, 
participants had to fill out questionnaires and took part in a trust 
game as well as in a coin flip setting. In step two they were informed 
about the outcome of one of these decisions and paid afterwards. 
Step One. Participants were surveyed during an introductory 
psychology class. Our experiment manipulated one factor between-
subjects (conditional vs. unconditional feedback) and one factor 
within-subjects (trust game vs. coin flip). To the beginning of the 
psychology class we asked students to participate in an experiment 
by filling out a questionnaire. Then two different kinds of 
questionnaires – one for the conditional feedback condition and one 
for the unconditional feedback condition – were randomly assigned to 
them.  
Conditinal feedback. First, students were asked for a personal 
codeword to ensure anonymity in the questionnaire. Then, they were 
told that they would have to make three decisions from which one 
would be randomly chosen to be carried out for real money. In a next 
step, the binary trust game was introduced to them and they had to 
fill in 4 control questions regarding the outcomes of this setting. 
Participants should estimate which percentage of trustees would 
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behave trustfully and share the €20 equally vs. the percentage of 
trustees that would prove untrustworthy and keep the whole €20 for 
themselves. Hereafter, participants learned that they should make a 
decision in the role of the trustor as well as in the role of the trustee.  
In the role of the trustor participants had to decide whether 
they want to keep €5 or hand it over to the trustee. They were 
informed that trustors would learn the decision of the trustee as well 
as being paid during the next class, if they handed over the money. 
However, it was emphasized that if they kept the €5, they would 
receive this money in the next class too, but would never learn the 
decision of their assigned trustee.  
Furthermore, participants had to decide what they would do, if 
they received €20 in the role of the trustee. As described, they could 
decide to keep this whole amount for themselves or to give back €10 
to the trustor. Students were told that participants that were 
randomly selected as trustees would be informed about the decision 
of their assigned trustor as well as paid being in the next class. Then 
participants made their decision both as trustee and trustor. 
Hereafter, the coin flip was introduced to participants. A 
situation was presented in which a person received €5 and could bet 
this money on heads or tails in a coin flip. In the case that the person 
bet the money and won, the person received €10. However, if the 
person bet the money and lost, the person lost the €5. To ensure the 
understanding of that paradigm, participants had to fill in 3 control 
questions regarding the outcome of this setting. Then participants 
were told that they should now make a decision for the coin flip that 
would be conducted during the next class one week later. Therefore, 
they should indicate whether they want to keep or to bet €5 in the 
described coin flip. Only if participants decided to bet the money, 
they should indicate whether they want to put their money on heads 
or tails. It was stressed that the coin flip, which would be conducted 
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one week later, was only of importance for participants that decided 
to bet their money.  
At the end of the questionnaire, participants had to fill out 
some questions concerning demographical data. 
Unconditinal feedback. Questionnaires in the unconditional 
feedback condition were almost identical to the ones in the 
conditional feedback condition. Only the conditions of feedback 
differed that participants received in both decisions, when they kept 
the €5. 
In the trust game, participants were informed that they would 
always learn the decision of their assigned trustee, if they decided in 
the role of the trustor and this decision would be selected to be 
carried out with real money. Before participants made their decision 
it was emphasized that they would also learn the decision of their 
assigned trustor when keeping the €5. This was different to the 
conditional feedback condition in which trustors only learned the 
decision of their assigned trustee, if they handed over their money. 
In the coin flip, participants should not only chose heads or 
tails, if they bet the €5 but also when they kept it. When they kept 
the money, they were asked to indicate whether they would have put 
their money on heads or tails, if they had bet it. It was emphasized 
that we would remind them in the next week on their decision for 
heads or tails. Thus, participants knew that they would be aware of 
whether they would have won or lost their €5 during the next class, if 
they decided to keep their money. 
Step two. In the beginning of the introductory psychology class, 
one week after participants had filled out the questionnaires, a coin 
was flipped in the front of the classroom. At the end of the lecture all 
participants received an envelope that was only marked with the 
personal codeword participants had provided one week before. For 
each participant the envelope contained the information which of his 
three decisions was selected to become real as well as the money that 
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was related to that decision. Furthermore, all participants that were 
assigned to the unconditional feedback condition, but had decided to 
keep the €5 were informed, if they would have doubled the money by 
handing it over in the trust game or betting it in the coin flip 
respectively. 
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. The influence of curiosity and regret on trust decisions 
The main question of this paper was whether trust decisions 
are influenced by curiosity or regret aversion. In order to find out, we 
compared a trust game with conditional feedback to a trust game 
with unconditional feedback. In the first one trustors had to hand 
over money to learn the decision of their interaction partner and in 
the second one they received this feedback independently of their 
decision to hand over or keep their money. We expected to find more 
trustors handing over money in the conditional feedback than in the 
unconditional one, if they were mainly influenced by curiosity. 
However, we argued that also the reverse result could emerge, if 
trustors were more regret averse than curious in the conditional 
feedback condition. Figure 6 shows that 70% of the trustors handed 
over money in the conditional feedback condition and 76% in the 
unconditional one. Although this result suggested that participants 
were influenced rather by regret aversion than by curiosity a 
subsequent chi-square test showed that the difference in risky 
decisions between both feedback conditions was far from being 
significant, χ2 (1, n = 165) = .45, n.s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6: Percentage of participants, who chose the risky option in the trust 
game and the ordinary coin flip
Note: *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
6.3.2. Replication of
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  Trust vs. risk behavior.
we can replicate the finding that people are less risk seeking in
situations than in risky situations void of trust. Therefore, we had to 
compare the trust game with the coin flip in the conditional feedback 
condition. However, before we could compare the coin flip to the trust 
game we had to ensure that the perce
similar. The objective chance to double the money in the coin flip was 
50%. The estimated percentage of trustworthy trustees in the 
conditional feedback condition that can be interpreted as the 
perceived chance of doubling t
(SD = 26.3%) on average. An one sample t
70.0
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Trust Game
, separated by condition 
 
 Past Findings 
 First, we wanted to find out whether 
ived risk in both paradigms was 
he money in the trust game was 49.9% 
-test showed that the 
%
43.2%
76.0%
50.0%
Coin Flip
n.s. 
n.s. 
 82 
 
 
 trust 
Conditional 
Feedback
Uncondition
al Feedback
 83 
 
 
objective chance of winning in the coin flip and the perceived chance 
of winning in the trust game were not significantly different, t(88) = -
0.05, n.s. Thus, we could compare the trust game with the coin flip. 
However, although participants perceived both settings as 
equally risky, only 43.2% bet their money on the coin flip but almost 
70% (30 percentage points more) of the participants were willing to 
hand over money in the trust game (see Figure 6). A McNemar test 
revealed that this difference was significant, p < .01. We could also 
replicate the finding that people are much too cynical about the 
trustworthiness of others. In line with past studies most of the 
participants (69.7%) indicated in the role of the trustee that they 
would share received money with the trustor equally. However, as 
showed above, in the role of the trustor they were too cynical and 
estimated that only 49.9% (SD = 26.3) of their peers would do so. A 
one sample t-test revealed that this difference between actual 
trustworthiness of 69.7% and estimated trustworthiness of 49.9% 
was significant, t(88) = -7.12, p < .01 (see also Figure 7).  
Although not predicted, we found similar results in the 
unconditional feedback condition. Again the trust game was 
comparable to the coin flip in matters of the perceived risk involved in 
both settings. Trustors estimated on average that 53.2% of trustees 
would prove trustworthy. This is not significantly different to the 
chance of doubling the money in the coin flip (50%), t(74) = 1.14, n.s. 
Again a McNemar test revealed that with 76%, much more 
participants handed over money in the trust game than participants 
bet money on the coin flip, in which only 50% were willing to go for 
the risky option, p < .01 (see Figure 7).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 7: Trustor’s e
game in comparison to the actual behavior of trustees
Note: *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Furthermore, participants underestimated the trustworthiness 
of others in the unconditional feedback condition, too. Actually, 80% 
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6.4. Discussion 
 The main purpose of this study was to examine the influence of 
curiosity as well as regret on trust decisions. We argued that trustors 
could hand over money in trust games because they might be curious 
about the behavior of their interaction partner. In addition, we 
pointed out that people, who trust others out of curiosity, also run 
the risk to get betrayed and, thus, to regret their decision to trust 
afterwards. We argued that this tendency could have an opposing 
influence on trust decisions to curiosity, because people tend to avoid 
potential regret. On that issue, we compared a trust game with 
conditional feedback to one with unconditional feedback. Higher trust 
rates under conditional than unconditional feedback would have 
supported the curiosity hypothesis while reverse result would have 
supported the regret hypothesis. However, we could not find a 
statistically significant difference in trust rates between both 
conditions. Under conditional feedback 70% of the participants 
handed over their money to a trustee. Under unconditional feedback, 
the share of trusting participants rose to 76%. This finding does not 
allow us to draw a clear conclusion about the influence of curiosity 
and regret aversion on trust decisions. In fact, this finding allows 
different and equally reasonable interpretations. 
First, it is possible that neither curiosity nor regret aversion 
has an influence on trust decisions. In terms of curiosity it is just as 
possible that people are not interested in the behavior of their 
interaction partner as it is possible that they are. Likely, people 
participating in trust games do not understand that they take part in 
a pure trust situation that is different to the kind of trust situations 
they face in everyday life. A second possibility is that people recognize 
the uniqueness of the trust situation they are confronted with, but do 
not consider this new situation as interesting or exciting enough to 
become curious – although this is hard to believe for a psychological 
scientist.  
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Harder to explain would be why regret aversion does not have 
an influence on trust situations. As we have shown above, regret 
aversion is a frequently replicated phenomenon in risky situations 
void of trust. However, it could be that people have inherently 
different motivations in trust than in lottery situations and, thus, 
avoiding regret has only little or no influence on people in trust 
situations. This logic would match the finding by Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning (2010b) that people’s behavior in trust situations is also 
quite insensitive to changes in risk as pointed out in the introduction.  
Second, it is possible that we did not find a difference in trust 
rates between the conditional and the unconditional feedback 
condition, because trustors were influence by curiosity and regret 
aversion to the same extend. Curiosity could have increased trustors’ 
propensity to hand over money in the conditional feedback condition 
while regret aversion would have diminished it. Potentially, both 
forces could have balanced. The finding that curiosity can kill regret 
in risky situations void of trust was already reported by Van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg (2005). 
 On the basis of our data we cannot determine which 
explanation is more valid. Also a consideration of the results of the 
coin flip cannot shed light on that issue. In fact, taking the results of 
the coin flip into account brings up a third possible explanation for 
the null results of this study. Unexpectedly, we could not replicate an 
effect of regret aversion in the coin flip. Similar to the trust game, the 
number of risky choices in the coin flip was higher under 
unconditional feedback (50%) than under conditional feedback (46%) 
whereas this difference was not significant. However, an influence of 
regret aversion on risky situations void of trust is a phenomenon 
frequently shown in past studies (Josephs et al., 1992; Zeelenberg et 
al. 1996; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). Therefore, it might be that the 
design of this study itself failed to elicit regret aversion. 
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Participants in most former studies could chose between a 
more or a less risky lottery while it was manipulated about which 
lottery participants received unconditional vs. conditional feedback 
(Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). In contrast to 
these former studies, participants in our study did not choose 
between a more vs. less risky option but between a risky option vs. a 
sure one. Furthermore, our study did not reverse unconditional and 
conditional feedback between conditions. In fact, our study only 
manipulated whether participants received conditional vs. 
unconditional feedback about the risky outcome whereas they always 
received unconditional feedback about the sure outcome. It is 
possible that people, who are influenced by potential regret, when 
they have to decide between more or less risky lotteries, are not 
influenced by potential regret when they can decide between a sure 
gain and a lottery. These people might always prefer a sure option, if 
given to them.  
Furthermore, it is possible in our case that regret aversion 
motivated these people even in the unconditional feedback condition 
to go for the sure option. Participants could not avoid potential regret 
here. They either ran the risk to learn that they could have doubled 
their money, if they kept it and their interaction partner was 
trustworthy, or risked to learn that they should have kept the €5, if 
they bet it and lost the money. Ordinarily, “losses loom larger than 
gains” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p.279) for people (see also 
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). That means it should feel 
worse to lose €5 than it is pleasing to win this money. In our trust 
game, as well as our coin flip, participants were told that they receive 
€5 that they can keep or hand over/bet to have the opportunity to 
receive additionally €5. Participants might have perceived the 
situation in which they hand over/bet money and lose it as a loss 
and the situation in which they keep money and learn that they 
could have doubled their money as a foregone gain. If that is true, 
participants should have perceived the first situation as more 
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regrettable than the second one and, thus, should have kept their 
money because of regret aversion not only in the conditional but also 
in the unconditional feedback condition.  
This last potential explanation for our null results seems to be 
as reasonable as the first two explanations. However, it has to be 
borne in mind that the explanation discussed above is strongly based 
on the fact that we did not find an influence of regret aversion in the 
coin flip. Yet, the null-result in the coin flip could also have a further 
reason. The decisions of the trust game and coin flip were collected 
within-subjects. All participants were firstly confronted with the trust 
game and its related decisions and then with the coin flip. We did not 
alternate the order of the trust game and coin flip in order to get most 
valid and clean results for trustors’ behavior between both (between-
subjects) feedback conditions. However, this design may have caused 
flawed results in the coin flip because of an order effect. It is possible 
that the decisions in the coin flip were somehow influenced by the 
decisions in the trust game participants had had to make beforehand. 
Corroborating this reasoning, we found much higher rates of risky 
decisions (46%) under conditional feedback in the coin flip than in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 as well as found by Schlösser (2009).  
In conclusion, this study could replicate that people behave 
more risk seeking in trust situations than in risky situations void of 
trust, although they underestimate the trustworthiness of their 
partner of interaction by a crucial amount. However, the main 
question of this study, if trust decisions are influenced by curiosity 
and regret aversion, could not be answered. Therefore, further 
studies have to manipulate curiosity and regret aversion 
independently. Only if both potential motivations can be separated, 
we can finally determine the influence of curiosity on trust and 
maybe even explain why people behave so trustfully. Furthermore, 
this study showed that regret aversion could not be replicated in a 
risky decision situation slightly different to former situations that 
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were used to show regret aversion. We pointed out that this finding 
could be due to the within-subjects design we applied in this study. 
However, it is also possible that the phenomenon of regret aversion is 
not as reliable and fundamental as past studies want to make us 
believe. Thus, further research should also focus on the applicability 
and borders of regret theory explaining decision making under risk. 
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7. General discussion 
7.1. Summary of empirical results and integrative 
discussion 
All three studies I have discussed in this work examined 
explanations for trust behavior in an experimental setting.  
In Chapter 4, I discussed common explanations for people 
exhibiting high trust posited by other researchers and tested them in 
a series of experimental studies. In this series of studies, my 
coauthors and I tested whether trust can be explained when we 
relaxed these strict assumptions made about human behavior and 
applied following economic and rational choice theory. Nonetheless, 
we only tested whether trust behavior can be explained by changing 
certain assumptions such theorists make about human behavior. We 
did not challenge the consequential approach in the theories. 
 In addition, we tested whether high trust rates in past studies 
were caused by a methodological flaw, the fact that participants made 
their decisions using a show-up fee. Our results showed that high 
trust rates cannot be explained by house money effects or beliefs 
about trustworthiness, risk tolerance, or distributional preferences.  
 In Chapter 5, we examined trust situations in which trustors 
cannot improve their circumstances by trusting. To the best of my 
knowledge, this was the first time these kinds of trust situations were 
examined empirically. In order to do that, we systematically 
manipulated the potential gains trustors could acquire in trust games 
if they relied on a trustworthy trustee (betweens-subjects). This 
examination also tackled the question concerning the extent to which 
trust behavior of people is influenced by strategic considerations. 
Furthermore, we compared the behavior of the trustors to the 
behavior of people who participated in lotteries that were void of trust 
but involved similar risks and identical gains like those considered in 
the trust games. Our results showed two things. On the one hand, 
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trustors were strongly influenced by changes in potential gains in 
both the trust games and the lotteries. They exhibited lower trust 
when the potential gains were smaller. On the other hand, risky 
decisions in the lottery decreased to almost zero when no more gains 
could be made, while the trust rates in the trust games were quite 
stable even when there were no or negative potential gains.  
 When the results reported in Chapters 4 and 5 are considered 
jointly, it is easy to see that the economic or rational choice approach 
to trust fails to explain that phenomenon. Even if the assumptions of 
these concepts are relaxed, trust behavior cannot be explained. The 
experiments covered in the two chapters also challenge the 
perspective that trust decisions are instrumental or consequential, 
which means only focused on outcomes.  
The experiments covered in Chapter 4 produced no evidence 
that trustors care about the outcomes for the trustee when they 
make trust decisions. There was only scant evidence that trustors 
cared about their own outcomes in the trust game. A much higher 
percentage of participants in the trust game chose the risky option 
than participants in the coin flip, although both situations involved 
comparable risks as well as potential gains and losses. Furthermore, 
participants’ beliefs about their chance of doubling their money in the 
trust game (estimated percentage of trustworthy trustees) had very 
little influence on their decisions to trust. 
The results of the study in Chapter 5 strongly underline that 
trust cannot be merely outcome-focused. Although participants in a 
trust situation reacted quite strongly to changes in their potential 
gains, a substantial percentage of them trusted when we explicitly 
stated that they could not be better off and might be worse off by 
trusting. Again, I want to stress here that participants in the 
experiments described in both chapters had to make all their 
decisions using their own money. To the best of my knowledge, we 
are the first ones who conducted trust games in which participants 
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had to use their own money. Thus, the studies applied a much more 
realistic and conservative test of outcome-based trust explanations 
than all former studies. 
To summarize, while we found evidence that trust is partly 
determined by instrumental or consequential considerations, we also 
showed that these considerations were rather weak and cannot be 
the main drivers of trust behavior. 
 The question remains concerning which motivations or 
dynamics drive trust, if not considerations about outcomes. In 
Chapter 6, my coauthors and I approached that issue and examined 
whether trustors are influenced by curiosity in the moment they 
make their decision. In addition, we explored the influence of regret 
aversion on trust decisions.   
 The empirical results reported in Chapter 6 replicated the 
findings concerning high trust rates that were reported in Chapters 4 
and 5. In addition, we substantiated our findings that more people 
accept risks in trust situations than in situations void of trust. 
However, I could not answer the main question posed by this study: 
whether people participating in the trust game are influenced by 
curiosity or regret aversion.  
7.2. Conclusion   
In the introduction to this work, I posed a question concerning 
whether a change in thinking is necessary to explain the 
phenomenon of trust. Thereby, I challenged the validity of the strict 
economic and rational choice perspective as well as all consequential 
accounts of trust. In line with previous studies, I showed that trust 
behavior cannot be explained by a strict economic or rational choice 
approach. In addition, I showed that trust behavior is also not 
explainable when the strict assumptions of economic or rational 
choice theory are relaxed. These results corroborate the idea 
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presented by Dunning and Fetchenhauer (2010) that trust is 
basically non-consequential. 
However, the results of this work also show that there are 
limitations on the conclusion that trust is basically not outcome-
driven. First, I have probably not tested all possible outcome-based 
explanations for trust behavior. Second, I revealed that trust behavior 
is partly based on consequential or outcome-focused considerations 
since I could find an influence of potential gains and a weak influence 
of risk on trust decisions.  
Thus, this work first and foremost indicates that trust is a 
much more complex phenomenon than often assumed in the past. A 
change in thinking is insofar necessary that scholars examining trust 
have to adopt an interdisciplinary perspective. However, this work 
also revealed that past research put too much weight on the 
importance of consequential considerations in trust decisions. 
Further research should, therefore, focus more on non-consequential 
accounts - the next section provides an overview. 
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8. Non-consequential accounts of trust 
In contrast to researchers who accept neoclassical economic 
theory or rational choice sociology, those in other scientific 
disciplines do not assume that trust is driven by considerations 
about outcomes. A very comprehensive view of human decision 
making and behavior is provided by psychological scientists. These 
scholars have claimed that human decision making and social 
behavior are influenced by two different systems (Kahneman, 2003; 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001); Stanovich & West, 
2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In the literature, one can find 
various names attached to both systems. However, scholars who 
describe dual-system models bear similar ideas, so, following 
Stanovich and West (2000), I will refer to these systems with the 
generic names System 1 and System 2. System 1 is characterized as 
intuitive, fast, and effortless while System 2 is slow, controlled, rule-
based, and effortful. In everyday language, System 1 can be described 
as people’s intuition and System 2 as people’s reasoning (Kahneman, 
2003).  
Applying the framework of dual-system models to the topic of 
this work, most of the research on trust has considered trust 
decisions to be a result of rational considerations taking place in 
System 2. Apart from Chapter 6, in which my coauthors and I 
considered non-strategic, emotional curiosity as a reason for handing 
over money in trust games, the explanations of trust behavior 
examined in this work also assumed trust to be a behavior based on 
rational considerations. In contrast to these consequential accounts, 
researchers have already started to consider risk behavior to be 
strongly influenced by emotions, which are part of System 1. 
Of particular interest is a paper by Loewenstein et al. (2001) in 
which “the central role that feelings play in determining people’s 
choice and other responses under conditions of risk and uncertainty” 
is underlined (p. 274). Loewenstein et al. differentiated between 
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anticipatory emotions (here immediate emotions) and anticipated 
emotions. Immediate emotions are those people feel in the moment 
they make their decision and should be ascribed to System 1 rather 
than System 2. Anticipated emotions are those people predict they 
will feel in the future when they learn the consequences of their 
decisions. These emotions are the result of more deliberate 
considerations and should be ascribed to System 2 rather than 
System 1. Loewenstein et al. assumed that particularly immediate 
emotions, “which are often quite independent of the consequences of 
the decision can play a critical role in the choice one eventually 
makes” (p. 281).  
In the realm of trust, this hypothesis was corroborated by 
Schlösser et al. (2010). They showed that immediate emotions rather 
than expectations about future gains influence the decision to trust. 
In this study, participants were asked to indicate their emotions 
regarding six different scenarios just before they made their decision 
as a trustor in a trust game. Two of the scenarios asked for 
immediate emotions, and the other four scenarios asked for 
anticipated emotions. Measuring immediate emotions, participants 
were asked to indicate just before making their actual decision how 
they would feel if they 1. kept their money or 2. handed it over. To 
measure anticipated emotions, participants were asked to indicate 
how they would feel in the future if they 1. kept their money, and 
their interaction partner proved trustworthy; 2. kept their money, 
and their interaction partner proved untrustworthy; 3. handed over 
their money, and their interaction partner proved trustworthy; and 4. 
handed over their money, and their interaction partner proved 
untrustworthy. From a consequential perspective, only anticipated 
emotions -if any- should have predicted the decisions of the 
participants because they focus on the outcome of a decision. 
However, anticipated emotions accounted for only an insignificant 
10% of the decisions to trust. In contrast, immediate emotions had a 
 96 
 
 
significant impact in predicting the decision to trust or distrust, 
accounting for 21% of the variance in the decisions.  
In summary, considering the influence of emotions on trust 
behavior seems very promising with respect to explaining high trust 
rates. However, until now, it has been unclear why immediate 
emotions influence people in trust situations to such a great extent. 
Furthermore, the study by Schlösser et al. (2010) also clearly 
revealed that immediate emotions cannot be the only factor that 
determines trust behavior. In this work, we showed that the 
outcomes of a trust decision under certain conditions influenced 
trust behavior. Thus, the interplay of emotions and rational 
considerations should be subjected to further research.  
Dunning and Fetchenhauer (2010) used the results of 
Schlösser et al. (2010) to promote the idea that trust is an expressive 
rather than an instrumental act. This means that people trust 
“because of direct rewards the behavior itself provides or because 
performing the act itself fulfills some goal” (p. 102). In the same paper 
they discussed the possibility that trust behavior is based on a norm. 
Also in the work on hand it was examined whether trust behavior in 
trust games is based on norms of distributive justice. However, the 
norms considered here were outcome-oriented, meaning they 
examined whether trustors hand over money based on a norm that 
demands that trustors to accomplish certain outcomes. In contrast, 
Dunning and Fetchenhauer (2010) suggested that trustors may follow 
a norm that arises from the fact that trustors are placed in a 
relationship with the trustee that makes trustors behave “nicely” 
towards the trustee without focusing on outcomes. Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning (2010c) supported this idea in a study in which they showed 
that a minimal relationship between trustor and trustee is needed to 
trigger high trust rates. They conducted a binary trust game under 
three different conditions. Under the first condition, trustors were 
told that they had been assigned to a specific trustee before they 
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made their decision. Under the second condition, they were told that 
they had not yet been assigned to a specific trustee. Under the third 
condition, trustors were informed that they had been assigned to a 
trustee who did not know about the trust game and would never be 
informed about it if the trustor kept his money. 
 Trust rates of 55% and 60% were found under the first and the 
third conditions. This is an indication that as soon as a minimal 
relationship was established between trustor and trustee, there were 
high trust rates, even when this minimal relationship was restricted 
to private knowledge held by the trustor. However, only about 35% of 
trustors decided to trust under the second condition in which no 
minimal relationship was given. 
 These results are quite impressive, but the influence of norms 
on trust behavior needs to be corroborated in further studies. Trust 
behavior might be caused by factors different from norms. Moreover, I 
know from my own research that people are not able to tell whether 
they trusted based on a norm, a finding that was also reported by 
Dunning and Fetchenhauer (2010) as well as Zak (2008). 
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9. Further research 
The research discussed in the last section indicates the 
necessity for trust research focusing on emotions and norms. In the 
next few paragraphs, I will briefly delineate other areas for further 
research. Subsequently, I will present some study suggestions that 
apply or combine ideas and methods from the research fields 
discussed.  
9.1. Trust and individual differences 
 The role of individual differences on the propensity to trust has 
not been thoroughly examined experimentally (Evans & Revelle, 
2008; Snijders & Keren, 2001). The relationship of individual 
differences and self-reported trust towards a stranger has been 
examined by researchers using instruments like the World Value 
Survey. Their most common findings are that trust is positively 
associated with optimism, age, education and Protestantism (e.g., 
Delhey & Newton, 2005; Herreros & Criado, 2008; Uslaner, 2002). 
However, as I already stated in the introduction, such self-reports 
can be biased. Furthermore, in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I showed that 
trust on the cognitive side does not have to be related to trust 
behavior. In Chapter 10, I will point out particular individual 
differences that could influence trust behavior. Moreover, I will 
examine possible interactions between individual differences and 
situational factors. However, research should not stop here but 
should consider further individual differences that can contribute to 
explaining trust. 
9.2. Intercultural trust research 
 A further area for future research is intercultural trust research 
based on behavioral trust data. This research can shed light on how 
strongly trust behavior is influenced by cultural norms. In addition, a 
comparison of cultures and their levels of expressed trust could yield 
insights into how and why certain trust norms develop. Henrich et al. 
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(2010) did such an analysis on fairness norms with the help of a 
standardized dictator, ultimatum and third-party punishment game 
(see also Gächter, Herrmann & Thöni, 2010). Variations on the trust 
and investment game have been conducted in a multitude of cultures 
(Ashraf et al., 2006; Croson & Buchan, 1999; Holm & Danielson, 
2005). However, these trust and investment games differed greatly in 
their experimental design. In a recent meta-study considering trust 
and investment games conducted all over the world, Johnson and 
Mislin (2008) showed that about 40% of the variance between the 
trust rates in these games can be explained by the differences in the 
experimental protocols. Thus, in the future, a standardized trust 
game should be used to measure trust behavior in a broad range of 
cultures. 
9.3. Trust and evolutionary psychology 
 Trust behavior could be based on a cognitive adaptation 
evolved in humans’ environment of evolutionary adaptiveness (EEA). 
This cognitive adaptation could have evolved to solve the fitness 
relevant problem to deal with or establish cooperation with strangers 
in the EEA. Findings of Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009, 2010a) as 
well as those reported in this work show that people trust from a 
behavioral side but distrust from the cognitive one. From an 
evolutionary perspective, the behavior and cognition people express 
in trust situations involving strangers makes sense.  
For anyone who wants to establish cooperation, trust behavior 
is necessary because it is just not possible to begin cooperation with 
distrust. As shown in the TIT-FOR-TAT strategy, people have to begin 
with trusting as a first step when they are interested in future 
cooperation (Au & Komorita, 2002; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). 
 In addition, high suspicion of trustors can be explained by the 
evolutionary approach. Accordingly, even if it were an advantage to 
establish cooperation with strangers in the EAA in order to survive, 
by the same token, it cannot be adaptive to trust under every 
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condition. Such humans would be easy prey for all kinds of 
exploitation. Therefore, a cognitive adaptation that influences people 
to trust should take costs of trusting into account as well as a 
cautious assessment of potential interaction partners. 
 The finding that people seem to be influenced by immediate 
emotions in their decision to trust (Schlösser et al., 2010) also fits in 
this framework. Cognitive adaptations influence behavior through 
emotions (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, 2000).  
 One might argue that a cognitive mechanism evolved for the 
EEA, cannot account for trust behavior in trust games because 
interactions with strangers in the natural past of humans were 
neither certain one-shot interactions nor entirely anonymous. 
However, some researchers have argued that precisely because their 
cognitive machinery is not evolved for economic games, people behave 
in these paradigms as if their interactions were not anonymous or 
nonrecurring (Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006; Price, 2008). The 
argument is that people are either not adapted to anonymous one-
shot interactions at all or that people are adapted to these situations 
but that economic games do not resemble these ancestral situations, 
so they trigger the wrong cognitive module to behave appropriately in 
these games. The last argument is based on the fact that people who 
take part in an economic game usually gather with many other 
participants in one room and know that their behavior will be 
analyzed by the experimenter (Price, 2008). Thus, although 
participants might know that their interactions in economic games 
are anonymous and nonrecurring, it could be that cognitive 
mechanisms are triggered that have evolved for situations in which 
behavior was neither anonymous nor nonrecurring.  
However, the evolutionary approach presented is highly 
speculative. To corroborate the idea that findings in the trust game 
can be explained by a cognitive adaptation, one must meet difficult 
requirements. Adaptations have to solve problems relevant to fitness, 
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which cannot be solved by other adaptations, in situations that 
recurred ancestrally and are marked by reliable, repeated structures 
and identifiable cues (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Whether a cognitive 
adaptation that is trust-related satisfies these requirements has not 
been examined yet. 
9.4. Trust, biology and neuroeconomics 
 Up to this point, I have considered trust from a psychological, 
economic, sociological, and philosophical point of view. However, in 
recent years, more and more researchers from various disciplines 
have examined biological foundations of social behavior (Camerer, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2004; Epstein, Israel, Chew, Zhong, & Knafo, 
2010; Fehr & Camerer, 2007). They are searching for genetic 
influences on human behavior and trying to get a deeper 
understanding of how brain processes and hormones are related to 
social behavior. There are multitudes of methods used in this 
research,  including twin studies, genome-wide association studies, 
functional magnetic resonance imaging, and manipulation of 
hormones. 
 Concerning trust it was shown that trust behavior is strongly 
influenced by the neuropeptide oxytocin. In a study by Kosfeld, 
Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, and Fehr (2005), participants who 
received an intranasal administration of oxytocin sent more money to 
a stranger in a trust game than participants who were administered a 
placebo. However, oxytocin did not affect participants’ estimates 
about being repaid by the trustee nor their risk tolerance in a lottery 
void of trust. 
 Others have shown that trust is partly inheritable. Cesarini, 
Dawes, Fowler, Johannesson, Lichtenstein, and Wallace (2008) 
examined the trust behavior of monozygotic (genetically identical) and 
dizygotic (genetically nonidentical) twins in Sweden and in the United 
States. By comparing dizygotic and monozygotic twins, they were able 
to separate environmental influences on trust from genetic ones. 
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They estimated that trust was 20% inherited in the Swedish sample 
and 10% in the U.S. sample. 
 In summary, biology could help to disentangle to what degree 
trust is hardwired and independent of situational factors. This 
analysis may also explain individual differences in trustfulness by 
examining genetic differences. Moreover, the methods of 
neuroeconomics might illuminate how trust decisions are processed 
in the brain and whether the brain processes trust decisions 
differently to risky decisions void of trust. 
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10. Further studies 
10.1. More nosy than regret averse – Five follow-up 
studies 
 In Chapter 6, my coauthors and I emphasized the need for 
further research on the influence of curiosity and regret aversion on 
trust decisions. We discussed the possibility that neither curiosity 
nor regret aversion have an influence on the decision to trust. 
However, we also pointed out that the design of the experiment I 
presented might have been inappropriate to show the influence of 
curiosity and regret aversion.   
 In that study, the trust rates of a trust game with conditional 
feedback were compared to those in a trust game with unconditional 
feedback. In the trust game with conditional feedback, trustors 
learned whether their trustee was trustworthy only if they handed 
over money to him. In the trust game with unconditional feedback, 
trustors always learned whether their trustee was reliable no matter 
if they decided to hand over money to the trustee or to keep it. 
 We argued that neither curiosity nor regret aversion should 
have influenced trustors in the trust game with unconditional 
feedback to shift their decision from keeping the money to handing 
over the money or vice versa. Under this condition, trustors always 
learned whether their trustee was trustworthy, so they should not 
have been influenced by curiosity. In addition, they could not avoid 
regret. If they kept the money, they ran the risk of learning that their 
trustee would have been trustworthy and that they could have 
doubled the money by handing it over. However, handing over the 
money could not protect them from potential regret. If they handed 
over the money, they ran the risk of learning that their trustee was 
untrustworthy and that they would have been better off keeping their 
money. 
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 In contrast, in the trust game with conditional feedback, a 
trustor should have been influenced by both regret aversion and 
curiosity, but in opposite directions. On the one hand, trustors 
learned about the trustworthiness of their trustee only if they handed 
over money. Hence, curiosity should have influenced the trustors to 
hand over their money. On the other hand, under conditional 
feedback, trustors could avoid potential regret by keeping their 
money. If trustors kept their money, they never learned the reliability 
of their trustee, so they never knew whether they would have doubled 
their money by handing it over. Hence, regret aversion should have 
influenced trustors to keep their money.  
 In summary, the methodological weakness of the experiment 
presented was that an influence of curiosity and regret aversion on 
the trust decision was not present under unconditional feedback, but 
both were present simultaneously in the conditional feedback 
condition. The presented experiment could only have shown an 
influence of curiosity or regret aversion if one of these forces had 
been much stronger than the other one. If that had been the case, a 
comparison of the trust rates under both conditions would have 
revealed the stronger force. A strong influence of curiosity combined 
with a weak (or absent) influence of regret aversion would have led to 
higher trust rates under the conditional than the unconditional 
feedback condition. A strong influence of regret aversion combined 
with a weak (or absent) influence of curiosity would have led to lower 
trust rates under the conditional than under the unconditional 
feedback condition. In the experiment, comparably high rates of trust 
were found. Hence, trustors were influenced neither by curiosity nor 
by regret aversion, or they were influenced by both forces to a similar 
extent. A third possibility is that the design of the study in Chapter 6 
was not appropriate to measure curiosity or regret aversion in the 
trust game. 
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 In the following chapters, I describe 5 studies extending the 
research on curiosity and risk aversion. Studies 1 and 2 show 
different methods to measure the influence of curiosity and regret 
aversion in trust games. Studies 3, 4, and 5 show how the design of 
the experiment from Chapter 6 could be altered so that the presence 
of curiosity and regret aversion can be manipulated independently. 
10.1.1. Curious people trust while regret averse people 
distrust? Examination of individual differences 
 All studies on trust towards strangers show that some people 
trust strangers and some do not. Hence, these studies reveal 
individual differences in the level of trust. The following study 
considers whether these individual differences in expressed trust at 
least partly stem from individual differences in curiosity and regret 
aversion. Do curious people trust and regret averse people distrust?  
If that is true, the null results in Chapter 6 would be 
explainable. In the conditional feedback condition, trustors would 
have been influenced by curiosity as well as regret aversion. The 
individual differences in curiosity and regret aversion would have 
caused the trustors who were more curious than regret averse to 
trust in the conditional feedback situation. Trustors who were more 
regret averse than curious kept their money in this condition. In 
contrast, under unconditional feedback, trustors would have neither 
been influenced by curiosity to hand over their money nor by regret 
aversion to keep their money. Thus, more curious as well as more 
risk averse trustors could have made decisions quite randomly in the 
unconditional feedback situation. If in addition it is assumed, that 
about 50% of our participants were more curious than regret averse 
and the other 50% were more regret averse than curious, trust rates 
of about 50% should have been observed under both feedback 
conditions. Under conditional feedback, the 50% of participants who 
trusted would have been rather curious participants, and the 50% 
who distrusted would have been rather regret-averse participants. 
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The same distribution of decisions in the unconditional feedback 
condition would have been due to random behavior. Random 
behavior also results in a 50/50 distribution of choices.  
To test the validity of this reasoning, the individual level of 
curiosity and regret aversion of participants that attend a trust game 
should be measured beforehand. 
Concerning curiosity, it is known that people differ in their level 
of curiosity (see Loewenstein, 1994 for an overview). The literature 
provides various measurements of curiosity. For the following 4 
studies, I use the Curiosity and Exploration Inventory (CEI) developed 
by Kashdan, Rose, and Fincham (2004). This 10-item inventory 
provides good validity and temporal consistency.    
Unfortunately, there is no measure for individual differences in 
regret aversion. However, Josephs et al. (1992) showed that people 
differ in their tendency to make regret-minimizing choices. They 
argued that the person’s chronic level of self-esteem determines 
whether he is regret averse or not. Accordingly, people with low self-
esteem are regret averse because they want to protect themselves 
from threat. In three studies, Josephs et al. supported this theory 
empirically. Using the method they developed, I will measure the self-
esteem of participants using the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale (RSES) (Rosenberg, 1965) as a proxy.  
In all studies in which curiosity or self esteem are used to 
predict trust behavior, participants should fill out the CEI and the 
RSES at least two weeks before they make their trust decision in the 
lab. This should ensure that participants are not influenced by the 
questionnaires in their decision to trust. 
10.1.2. Study 1 
 The first study examines whether the level of individual 
curiosity and the individual level of self-esteem can predict decisions 
in trust games. In order to do this, the experiment presented in 
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Chapter 6 is replicated. However, a difference in this experiment is 
that the curiosity and self-esteem of participants who attend the trust 
game as trustors is surveyed two weeks before they make their 
decisions in the lab. Furthermore, only the trust game under 
conditional vs. unconditional feedback (between-subjects) is examined 
and not the lottery paradigm. 
 I expect that the feedback condition alone cannot predict trust 
behavior in this experiment. However, I expect an interaction between 
the feedback condition and curiosity as well as the feedback 
condition and self-esteem on the decision to trust. The higher a 
trustor’s curiosity, the more likely it should be that he or she would 
hand over money in the conditional feedback situation. In addition, 
the higher a trustor’s self-esteem, the more likely it should be that a 
trustor would hand over money in the trust game in the conditional 
feedback situation. In addition, it should be analyzed whether a 
three-way interaction of curiosity, self-esteem, and a feedback 
condition can be found.  
10.1.3. Study 2 
Study 2 is a pilot study that should yield insight into the 
question concerning the strength of curiosity or regret aversion in 
trust decisions. The question that should be answered is whether 
people pay to receive or avoid feedback about the decision of their 
interaction partner and whether this willingness to pay is related to 
individual differences in curiosity and self-esteem. 
In order to do this, a trust games is conducted under two conditions: 
default feedback and default no feedback. Participants are randomly 
assigned to one of the two conditions and should make a decision as 
a trustor.  
In the default no feedback condition, participants are told that 
they can keep or hand over money. In addition, they are informed 
that they have two possibilities to receive feedback about their 
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interaction partners. They can either hand over their money or they 
can keep their money and pay for the feedback information. If they 
decide to keep their money and pay for the information, they should 
indicate how much of their show-up fee (€5) they are willing to pay. 
To elicit the true willingness to pay, an auction that is based on the 
Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker, DeGroot, & 
Marschak, 1964) is used. This means that participants are informed 
that the experimenter will randomly draw a price between €0 and €5 
after the experiment. If their indicated willingness to pay is higher 
than the randomly drawn price, they will pay only the drawn price 
and receive feedback about the decision of their interaction partner. 
However, if their indicated willingness to pay is lower than the 
randomly drawn price, they will not have to pay anything but also 
will not receive feedback. 
Under the default feedback condition, participants should 
indicate whether they want to keep or hand over money, too. They are 
told that they will receive feedback about their partner of interaction 
no matter whether they will keep or hand over their money. However, 
they are offered to turn down receiving feedback if they keep their 
money. If they decide to keep their money and turn down feedback, 
they have to pay for that. Then, they should indicate how much of 
their show-up fee (€5) they are willing to pay in order to avert 
feedback. To elicit their true willingness to pay, the same BDM-
auction is used as in the conditional feedback condition.  
After the experiment, it is analyzed whether trustors in the 
default no feedback condition who chose to keep their money paid for 
feedback about their interaction partner. If a willingness to pay is 
found, I expect this willingness to pay to be dependent on the level of 
curiosity the participants indicated in the CEI – more curious 
participants should have a higher willingness to pay. 
In the default feedback condition, it is analyzed whether 
trustors who chose to keep their money paid for avoiding feedback. If 
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a willingness to pay is found, I expect this willingness to pay to be 
dependent on the self-esteem of the participants. Following Josephs 
et al. (1992), participants with a lower self-esteem should have a 
higher willingness to pay. 
Unfortunately, this experiment has three shortcomings.  
1) The willingness to pay for receiving feedback cannot be 
compared to the willingness to pay for avoiding feedback. The reason 
is that curious participants who want to receive feedback in the 
default no feedback condition do not necessarily have to pay for the 
feedback but can just hand over their money to their trustee. 
2) Only the behavior of participants who keep their money can 
be analyzed and compared. However, it would also be interesting to 
know about their willingness to pay for receiving feedback from the 
trustors who hand over their money. 
3) The experiment does not manipulate the presence of 
curiosity and regret aversion independently. It suffers from the same 
weakness as the experiment that was presented in Chapter 6. That 
means that a trustor who keeps his money under the default no 
feedback condition but is curious can choose the feedback 
information. However, if he does, he also has to accept the risk to 
learn that his interaction partner was trustworthy and the possible 
regret that he did not hand over his money. The same logic holds true 
for trustors who keep money in the default feedback condition and 
want to protect themselves from regrettable feedback. They can pay 
to avoid this information but this will mean never satisfying their 
curiosity. Admittedly, the experiment partly handles this problem by 
measuring individual differences. However, it is not clear yet whether 
these individual differences can explain the decision-making in trust 
games.  
Avoiding all three shortcomings of Study 2, Studies 3, 4, and 5 
manipulate the influence of curiosity and regret aversion 
independently. 
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10.1.4. Study 3 
 Study 3 provides a possibility to analyze the curiosity of 
trustors about the decision of their interaction partner in the absence 
of potential regret. Furthermore, it provides a possibility to measure 
the willingness to pay for feedback on the decision of the interaction 
partner of trustors who keep their money as well as trustors who 
hand over their money. The design of Study 3 entails deception. 
 In Study 3 participants are invited to a lab and seated in a 
cubicle with a computer. All participants are told that they will have 
to make two monetary decisions during the experiment in which they 
can make real money. Furthermore, all participants are told that 
some of them will make both decisions for real money and some just 
one. Since in the beginning of the experiment they neither know 
whether they will make both decisions or only one decision for real 
money nor which decision will be made for real money in the latter 
case, they should take both decisions seriously. Then the trust game 
with conditional feedback is introduced to the participants and they 
make a decision as the trustor. They are informed that they will learn 
the decision of their trustee at the end of the experiment if they hand 
over their €5 and are selected to make this decision or both of their 
decisions for real money.  
Hereafter, participants are instructed that they will now 
participate in a lottery. In the lottery, participants do not have to bet 
money but can win €10 (this is the same amount of money they could 
win in the trust game) or nothing. In the lottery, participants have to 
choose between two doors. Participants are told that behind one of 
the doors is the €10 and behind the other one there is nothing. 
Actually, it does not matter which door participants choose; they will 
always win the €10. Hereafter, the software assigns the participants 
randomly to one of two conditions: the one-win or double-win 
condition.  
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Under the one-win condition, participants are told that they 
made only the second decision for real money and that they will, thus, 
receive €10. They are informed that they have been assigned to a real 
trustee who also made a decision in the trust game and that this 
trustee was paid according to his decision and the decision of the 
participant. Whether they kept or handed over their money, 
participants are told that they are not supposed to learn the decision 
of their trustee (no matter whether they kept or handed over their 
money) because they did not make their trust decision for real money. 
However, participants are offered the chance to receive feedback 
about the decision of their trustee although they themselves did not 
make the first decision for real money. Participants should indicate a 
price between €0 and €5 they would pay for this information. The 
true willingness to pay is elicited by using a BDM auction as 
proposed in Study 2. 
Under the double-win condition, participants are told that they 
made both decisions for real money and that therefore they will 
receive €10 plus the amount they made in the trust game. They are 
informed that they have been assigned to a real trustee who also 
made a decision in the trust game and that this trustee was paid 
according to his decision and the decision of the participant. 
Participants who handed over their money receive feedback about the 
decision of their trustee. In addition, participants who kept their 
money in the trust game are offered the chance to receive feedback 
about the decision of their trustee although they kept their money. 
Again, they can pay for this information, and their true willingness to 
pay is elicited as it was in Study 2. 
After the experiment, all participants receive their money. In 
addition, a random price between €0 and €5 is drawn. Participants 
who took part in the double-win condition and kept their money as 
well as all participants of the one-win condition receive feedback only 
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if the price they were willing to pay for this information is higher than 
the randomly drawn price.  
In this experiment, participants who take part in the one-win 
condition have the opportunity to receive feedback about their 
interaction partner and satisfy their curiosity without the risk of 
experiencing regret. In the moment they make their decision, they do 
not know that this decision will not be carried out for real money. 
Afterwards, they should not feel any regret about the consequences of 
their trust decision because they know that the decision had no 
impact on their payoffs. However, they should still be curious about 
the decision of their interaction partner, when they can decide to 
receive or avoid feedback. They learn that their interaction partner 
made a real decision and was paid according to his or her own 
decision and the decision of the participant. Thus, the reality of the 
situation is not diminished by the fact that the trustor did not decide 
for real money. The feedback information about the trustee is real 
and can be known by the trustor. As mentioned in Chapter 6, people 
get particularly curious about information that is “already out there 
in the world” and can be known (Loewenstein, 1994; Van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2005).  
In contrast, participants who take part in the double-win 
condition and keep their money should stay regret averse after they 
made their decision in the lottery. If they receive feedback about their 
interaction partner, they run the risk of learning that their 
interaction partner was trustworthy and that they would have 
doubled their money by handing it over.  
After the experiment, first data of the one-win condition is 
analyzed, to find out whether trustors who decided to hand over their 
money indicated a higher willingness to pay for interaction partner 
feedback than trustors who decided to keep their money. Such a 
result would support the hypothesis that more curious participants 
are more likely to hand over money in trust games with conditional 
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feedback. However, it is also possible that no difference in the 
willingness to pay will be found. That could be true if, in general, 
trustors who hand over money and trustors who keep money are 
equally curious about the decision of their interaction partner. The 
difference in their decision to keep or to hand over money would then 
have to be attributed to a difference in regret aversion of both groups. 
Trustors who kept money would have been as curious as trustors 
who handed over money but more averse to regret. 
 To investigate this question, the willingness to pay for feedback 
of trustors who kept money in the one-win condition is compared to 
that of trustors who kept money in the double-win condition. Again, 
regret aversion cannot have an influence on the trustors’ willingness 
to pay in the one-win condition but it can influence trustors in the 
double-win condition. Thus, if trustors who kept money in the double-
win condition display a significantly lower willingness to pay for 
interaction partner feedback than trustors in the one-win condition, 
an influence of regret aversion on decisions in trust games with 
conditional feedback could be corroborated.  
It should be emphasized that the test of an influence of regret 
aversion is a very conservative test because trustors who keep money 
in the double-win condition receive a total of €15 in the experiment. In 
contrast, trustors who keep money in the one-win condition receive 
only €10. Thus, possible income effects should influence trustors in 
the double-win condition to pay more for interaction partner feedback 
than trustors in the one-win condition. 
A potential weakness of Study 3 is that the presence of 
curiosity as well as regret aversion is measured by the willingness to 
pay for interaction partner feedback. However, the question that 
should be answered is whether curiosity and regret aversion 
influence the decision to trust.  
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10.1.5. Study 4 
 Study 4 explores whether the presence or absence of potential 
regret, while deciding in a trust game, can influence the decision. In 
Study 4 participants attend a trust game with conditional feedback in 
which they make a decision as a trustor. Participants are randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions (between-subjects). The first 
condition is the regret condition and the second one is the no regret 
condition. Participants in both conditions are informed that only half 
of them will make their decision for real money and that it has 
already been randomly determined who will make his or her decision 
for real money. However, it is manipulated which information 
participants receive at what time. Participants in each condition are 
informed about the particular procedure of their condition before they 
make their decision: 
Under the regret condition, all trustors will first learn whether 
they made their decision for real money at the end of the experiment. 
Subsequently, all trustors who handed over money are informed 
about the trustworthiness of their trustee. Then participants are paid, 
and the experiment is over. 
Under the no regret condition, first, all trustors who handed 
over money are informed about the decision of their trustee at the 
end of the experiment. Subsequently, only trustors who kept money 
as well as trustors who handed over their money and were assigned 
to a reliable trustee learn whether they made their decision for real 
money or not. Then, participants are paid, and the experiment is over. 
 The situation of the regret condition does only differ from the 
situation of an ordinary trust game with conditional feedback in that 
only half of the participants will make their decision for real money. 
As in the ordinary trust game with conditional feedback, trustors can 
satisfy their curiosity about their interaction partner only by handing 
over money. However, if they hand over money, they run the risk of 
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learning that their trustee was unreliable and that they would not 
have lost their show-up fee by keeping the money. 
 In contrast, under the no regret condition, participants cannot 
be influenced by regret. If they keep their money, they will never learn 
the decision of their interaction partner and will never know whether 
it would have been better to hand over the money. If they hand over 
their money, they learn the decision of their interaction partner. 
However, in contrast to the regret condition, in the no-regret condition 
this information is not potentially threatening. If they learn that their 
trustee was reliable, they know that they made a good decision. If 
they learn that their trustee was untrustworthy, they will never learn 
whether they made their decision for real money. Hence, they can 
easily rationalize that their decision was probably not made for real 
money anyway. 
 After the experiment, it is analyzed whether more trustors 
handed over money under the no-regret condition than in the regret 
condition. This result would support the hypothesis that trust 
decisions are influenced by curiosity in the ordinary trust game with 
conditional feedback.  
10.1.6. Study 5 
 In Studies 3 and 4, the influence of regret aversion is examined 
only indirectly. Both studies, examine whether the influence of 
curiosity becomes stronger if the experimental design eliminates the 
presence of regret aversion. Furthermore, in the first four studies, 
regret aversion was considered to be a factor that promotes risk-
averse behavior (keeping money) only. However, past studies showed 
that regret aversion can also promote risk-seeking behavior 
(Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). Study 5 is 
designed to examine whether regret aversion can also promote risk-
seeking behavior (handing over money) in trust situations.  
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 The design of Study 5 is similar to that of Study 4. Again, 
participants attend a trust game playing the role of the trustor and 
are randomly assigned to two conditions that are identical to the 
regret and no-regret condition of Study 4. The only difference to Study 
4 is that this time the trust game features unconditional feedback 
instead of conditional feedback, which should cause trustors to be in 
a very different decision situation. 
 Now, the situation of the former regret condition (here: condition 
1) does only differ to the situation of a trust game with unconditional 
feedback with respect to the fact, that only half of the participants 
will make their decisions for real money. In contrast to Study 4, the 
decisions of participants playing under this condition should be 
influenced neither by curiosity nor by regret. All trustors are 
informed whether they made their decision for real money and, 
independent of their own decision, all trustors learn the decision of 
their interaction partner. 
 Also the former no-regret condition (here: condition 2) changes 
entirely. In contrast to Study 4, trustors can no longer be influenced 
by curiosity, but they may be influenced by the threat of future regret. 
They cannot be influenced by curiosity because they receive feedback 
about the decision of their interaction partner independently from 
their own decision. However, trustors can be influenced by regret now. 
Trustors first learn whether their trustee was reliable or not. Then all 
trustors who kept their money as well as those who handed over 
money and were assigned to a reliable trustee are informed whether 
they made their decision for real money. This means that trustors 
who keep money run the risk of learning that their trustee was 
reliable and that they made their decision for real money. Thus, 
keeping the money can cause regret in the future. The only thing 
trustors can do to avoid potential regret in the future is to hand over 
their money. If they hand over their money and learn that their 
interaction partner was trustworthy, they know that they made a 
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good decision. If they hand over their money and learn that their 
interaction partner was untrustworthy, they will never know whether 
they made their decision for real money.  
 After the experiment, it is analyzed whether more trustors 
handed over money under condition 2 than condition 1. This result 
would support the hypothesis that trust decisions are influenced by 
regret aversion in the ordinary trust game with conditional feedback.  
 A potential weakness of Study 4, and in particular Study 5, is 
there complexity. Thus, it is very important in both studies that the 
procedure of the experiments is thoroughly explained to all 
participants. In order to make sure that participants know the 
potential consequences of their behavior, they should be confronted 
with all scenarios that might happen when they keep or hand over 
their money, respectively. 
 However, if an influence of the manipulations of Studies 3, 4, 
and 5 can be found, a next step should be to examine in each 
experiment whether the effect of the manipulation on the trust 
decision is mediated by emotions that are related to curiosity or the 
fear of future regret. 
10.2. Normative influences on trust  
10.2.1. What we can learn from a public trust game 
 To investigate the relationship of trust and norms, I suggest as 
a first step a study that increases a normative influence on the 
decision of trustors in a trust game. This study should explore 
whether the behavior of trustors changes when the influence of 
norms is increased. Furthermore, this study can explore in which 
direction the behavior changes and thus might provide an idea about 
what kind of norms are prevalent in trust situations related to 
strangers.   
To increase the potential influence of norms in a trust situation 
related to a stranger, I suggest comparing an anonymous trust game 
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to a public one. In a public trust game, trustors could make their 
decision sitting with other trustors in one room and their decisions, 
identified with their first names, could be written on a board at the 
end of the experiment. Trustors in the public trust game would still 
be anonymous to the trustee but not to other trustors or the 
experimenter. 
Researchers have shown in other experimental games like the 
dictator game that participants adjust their behavior according to 
social norms when their decision is not entirely confidential. In a 
dictator game, the dictator can distribute a certain amount of money 
between himself and a second anonymous person (receiver). Usually, 
a double-blind design is applied in these games, which means that 
neither the receiver nor the experimenter can match the identity of a 
dictator to his decision. Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith 
(1994) revealed the change from a double-blind design to a single-
blind design, in which the experimenter knew the decision of the 
dictator and had a strong, positive impact on the amount the dictator 
gave to the second person (see also Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 
1996). Furthermore, it was shown that even the display of stylized 
eye-like shapes on a computer screen while dictators decide how 
much money to allocate to a second person can significantly increase 
their generosity (Haley & Fessler, 2005). 
In summary, participants who attend dictator games and play 
the role of dictators behave in a more pro-social manner when their 
decisions can be observed by others or when they feel observed. This 
behavioral change makes sense because it is assumed that 
participants who attend a dictator game know that the social norm in 
this game is to behave unselfishly and share a substantial proportion 
of the given money with the receiver (Androeni & Bernheim, 2009).  
From this analysis, one can conclude that participants playing 
a public trust game as trustors become concerned about social 
norms and the right behavior in this situation as well. However, in 
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contrast to the dictator game, it is not clear what kind of norm 
prevails during the trust game because trust is a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, without trust, many social dilemmas could 
not be solved (Kollock, 1998; Rothstein, 2000). In the introduction, I 
described the positive effects of trust on the individual, organizational, 
and societal level. Thus, trusting strangers can be seen as ethically 
right and admirable. Trust in the trust game could be seen as 
particularly heroic because the trust is pure here and can easily be 
exploited by the trustee. Thus, trusting in this situation might be 
considered to be a very strong signal of pro-social and reputational 
behavior. 
On the other hand, the opposite could be true. Precisely 
because trustees can exploit credulous trustors, trusting in the trust 
game could be seen as foolish and naïve.  
 The comparison of an anonymous trust game and a public one 
could shed light on the question of how most of the trustors assess 
this situation. It would make sense to add a coin flip to this 
experiment (between-subjects) to make sure that a difference in trust 
behavior between the anonymous and the public condition is not 
based on changed risk attitudes.  
10.2.2. The influence of descriptive and injunctive norms on 
trust decisions 
Even without knowledge of the particular norm that may be 
active in a trust situation involving strangers, social influence is 
known to affect people’s behavior in two different ways (Deutsch & 
Gerard, 1955). First, people can be influenced by descriptive norms, 
which specify what is usually done in a certain situation. People 
follow descriptive norms because they encompass information 
regarding behavior that is deemed effective or adoptive in a particular 
situation (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 
1993). Second, people can be influenced by injunctive norms, which 
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specify the behaviors that are usually approved in a certain situation. 
People follow these norms in order to avoid social sanctions (Cialdini 
et al., 1990; Reno et al., 1993). 
 The question arises as to whether or not people are influenced 
by descriptive or injunctive norms when making trust decisions. 
Furthermore, an examination of descriptive norms may explain the 
way in which trust is maintained in complex societies. A 
susceptibility to following a descriptive norm of trust may be one 
mechanism of maintaining high trust environments. An examination 
of injunctive norms may clarify whether people trust strangers 
because they believe that doing so is the morally right and socially 
expected behavior. This question is of particular interest in 
combination with other social dynamics that may encourage trust 
behavior, such as status or reputation, as explained in Chapter 10.4. 
Study 1. In order to examine the influence of descriptive and 
injunctive norms on trust, as a first step, I suggest measuring 
perceived descriptive and injunctive norms in a trust game and 
examining whether or not people behave in accordance with these 
perceived norms. In order to do so, participants would attend a trust 
game as trustors. Before making their decision, they would be asked 
to estimate the percentage of other trustors who would hand over 
money, as opposed to those who would keep the money in this 
particular decision situation, as a means of measuring the perceived 
descriptive norm. In order to measure the perceived injunctive norm, 
trustors should be asked to estimate the percentage of trustors who 
would say that someone should hand over the money, rather than 
keeping it, in this particular decision situation.  
 After the experiment, two things should be explored. First, the 
average perceived descriptive and injunctive norm in the trust game 
should be considered. Second, whether people behave in accordance 
with their perceived descriptive or injunctive norm should be 
analyzed. In addition, if influences of the perceived norms can be 
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determined, it should also be investigated whether people are more 
strongly influenced by the perceived descriptive or the perceived 
injunctive norm.  
 As the experiment is explorative, I do not have particular 
predictions as to the particular norms trustors perceive in a trust 
game nor as to whether or not they act in accordance with these 
perceived norms. 
 Study 2. I suggest proceeding one step further in a second 
experiment, in which participants attend a binary trust game under 
different norm manipulations (between-subjects). The descriptive 
norms could be manipulated by informing the participants that most 
people usually trust others in the trust game or that they tend to 
distrust others in the trust game. Injunctive norms could be 
manipulated by providing the participants with information as to 
whether or not others approve of handing over money in the trust 
game. However, in order to make the norm information credible and 
avoid arousing suspicion among participants, the norm manipulation 
should be done in a rather subtle manner.   
 In order to meet these requirements, participants could be 
invited to a lab to take part in a decision situation. Upon the 
participants’ arrival at the lab, they could be informed that they 
would need to wait briefly, as other participants are still completing 
the last session in the lab. Participants would be asked not to speak 
with one another prior to the experiment and to be ready to enter the 
lab immediately so as to avoid delays for later groups. In actuality, 
the participants in the lab would be comprised of two pairs of 
confederates, who would discuss the decision situation upon leaving 
the lab. The confederates’ statements could be manipulated 
according to the norm manipulation in a full between-subjects design. 
The confederates should leave the lab in pairs of two. To manipulate 
the descriptive norm, one pair of confederates could discuss the fact 
that the vast majority of people handed over money in this decision 
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situation or that the vast majority kept the money in the decision 
situation or an unrelated topic. In order to manipulate injunctive 
norms, the second pair could relate to the fact that most people 
thought that handing over money in the trust game was the right 
thing to do or that most believed that the only appropriate action to 
take in this situation was to keep money in the trust game or an 
unrelated topic. The experiment would feature a 3 (descriptive norm = 
handing over money vs. descriptive norm = keeping money vs. 
control) x 3 (injunctive norm = handing over money vs. injunctive 
norm = keeping money vs. control) between-subjects design. In order 
to make it plausible that the faux participants possess information 
about the decision situation, prior to the experiment, the real 
participants should be informed that they will be able to ask 
questions regarding the decision situation after the experiment. 
Furthermore, after the experiment, participants should be assessed 
in a funnel interview in order to determine whether they suspected 
the norm manipulations. 
As the experiment is explorative, I do not have particular 
predictions regarding main or interaction effects of descriptive and 
injunctive norms.  
  If an influence of norms on trust behavior is determined, it 
would be interesting to understand how norms influence trust 
behavior. Emotions have been argued to play a key role in compliance 
with social norms (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Thus, further studies 
should examine whether a change in behavior under certain norm 
manipulations is caused by a change in emotions that trustors 
experience while they are making their trust decision. 
10.3. The flesh is willing, but the spirit is weak? 
Kugler et al. (2009) demonstrated that trust rates dramatically 
decrease if trustors are instructed to consider the consequences of 
their decision to trust or distrust. In an experiment a continuous 
trust game was applied, in which trustors were endowed with 20 $1 
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bills and told that they could give between $1 and $20 to the trustee. 
The experimenter handed the trustee three times the amount of 
money that the trustor gave the trustee, who could send any fraction 
of it back to the trustor. Kugler et al. found that trust rates decreased 
if participants were told they should estimate before they made their 
actual decision how much their trustee would give them back when 
they sent either $1 or $10 or $20 to the trustee. 
The results of the study conducted by Kugler et al. (2009) are 
particularly interesting in view of the fact that trust decisions seem to 
be influenced by emotions as well as rational considerations, as 
indicated at the beginning of Chapter 8. I have argued that emotions 
are rooted in an automatic, effortless, and implicit system (System 1), 
whereas rational considerations are rooted in a controlled, rule-based, 
and effortful system (System 2). I also already pointed out that 
scientists have only just begun to understand the ways in which the 
interplay of emotions and rational considerations influences trust 
decisions. 
Kugler et al. (2009) argued that the change in behavior in their 
study was caused by the fact that trustors were asked to consider the 
consequences of their behavior. However, it is also possible that not 
only consequential thinking diminishes trust, but also the mere use 
of System 2. It is the distinct feature of System 2 to operate rational, 
rule-based. The risky nature of trust situations may become obvious 
when people thoroughly think about trust situations. In the trust 
game, individuals may additionally become more aware of the fact 
that the trustee has no rational reason to reciprocate their trust. 
Thus, the use of System 2 or the mere act of thoroughly thinking 
about a trust situation involving an unknown person resp. may 
inevitably lead to consequential thinking and lower trust. This logic 
also accords with the findings that I have presented in this work. 
Namely that on the cognitive side, people tend to distrust others and 
underestimate their trustworthiness, while trusting on the behavioral 
 124 
 
 
side. Thus, it seems plausible that an antagonistic relationship exists 
between emotions and rational considerations or between System 1 
and System 2, respectively in relation to trust. It appears as though 
emotions tend to influence people to trust, and rational 
considerations tend to influence people to distrust.  
Although it seems plausible that System 2 might influence 
people to distrust others, the question as to why emotions influence 
people to trust remains. At this point in time, I can only speculate 
about the reasons for that; nonetheless, I can offer two suggestions. 
First, Dunning and Fetchenhauer (2010) suggested that “favorable 
feelings might become more attached to trust and unfavorable 
feelings attached to the decision not to trust” and that “people may 
develop somatic markers, visceral or physiological reactions, that lead 
them to act in a more pro-social way than their risk tolerance and 
social expectations” (p. 122). A second explanation for the 
antagonistic relationship between emotions and rational 
considerations is the evolutionary account of trust presented in 
Chapter 9.3. 
However, evidence also exists, indicating that neither 
consequential thinking nor a higher involvement of System 2 
negatively influences trust behavior. On the one hand, this work, as 
well as that of Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009), found high rates of 
trust in binary trust games, in spite of trustors being asked to 
estimate the percentage of trustworthy trustees. On the other hand, 
Schlösser et al. (2010) conducted a binary trust game in which 
trustors were to indicate their immediate and anticipated emotions. 
As described in Chapter 8 of this work, when trustors have to 
indicate their anticipated emotions, they are confronted with all of the 
possible consequences that their decision to keep or to hand over 
money might have. Nevertheless, Schlösser et al. (2010) still found 
high trust rates. 
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How can these contradictory findings be explained? I believe 
that these contradictory findings might have been caused by 
differences in design between the studies.  
In the study conducted by Kugler et al. (2009), participants 
were asked to estimate the trustworthiness of trustees after they had 
been made aware of the fact that they would take on the role of the 
trustor and immediately before they made their decision. In contrast, 
in the study conducted by Fetchenhauer & Dunning (2009), as well 
as in all of the other studies presented here, the participants were 
first asked to estimate the trustworthiness of trustees and were only 
subsequently told that they would take part in the trust situation as 
the trustor. Hereafter, they were again confronted with their decision 
options and were thus unable to make their decision until then. 
Therefore, in these binary trust games, participants may no longer 
have been influenced by their (consequential) estimates by the time 
they were finally supposed to make their decisions. 
Second, in the study conducted by Kugler et al. (2009), a 
continuous trust game was used. A continuous trust game is far 
more complex than a binary one. Not only do trustors have to decide 
whether to hand over money or to keep it, they must also determine 
the amount of money that they wish to hand over. Furthermore, they 
must estimate whether their trustee is trustworthy, as well as the 
extent of this person’s trustworthiness. Thus, a continuous trust 
game provides a considerably greater number of opportunities for 
strategic considerations. Consequently, System 2 should be far more 
active in a continuous than in a binary trust game, thereby inducing 
trustors to be more influenced by consequential considerations in a 
continuous trust game. 
With respect to the study by Schlösser et al. (2010), it is 
possible that asking trustors for their anticipated emotions may 
induce less of an activation of System 2 and less consequential 
thoughts than one might think at first glance. When trustors are 
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asked to indicate their anticipated emotions, they do not actively 
ponder what will possibly happen upon handing over or keeping 
money, and are instead merely confronted with the emotional 
outcomes.  
Summarizing the last paragraphs, it is not entirely clear 
whether consequential thinking or a strong activation of System 2 
diminishes trust, nor whether an antagonistic relation exists between 
System 1 and System 2 concerning trust. In order to find out, I 
suggest three experiments. In all of the experiments, it should be 
examined whether not only consequential thinking, but also the mere 
manipulation of the involvement of System 2 or rational 
considerations respectively influences trust.  
In a first study, the results obtained by Kugler et al. (2009) 
should be replicated. In addition, Study 1 should examine whether a 
manipulation of System 2 by a cognitive load manipulation or the 
instruction to think thoroughly about the trust decision can influence 
trust behavior. In a second study it should determine whether the 
manipulations utilized in Study 1 can also influence trust decisions 
in a binary trust game. In the third study, the influence of System 2 
should be manipulated with a self-control depletion task. In addition, 
Study 3 should examine whether people trust less when their System 
2 is more active due to the fact that they are more strongly influenced 
by rational considerations. At the end of this section, I will explain 
how these findings might be used to yield a deeper understanding of 
the ways in which the interplay of emotions and rational 
considerations influences trust decisions. 
Study 1. In a first study, I suggest expanding the first 
experiment conducted by Kugler et al. (2009) with two additional 
conditions (between-subjects). As described above, in experiment 1 of 
Kugler et al. trustors were to determine the amount of money to give 
a trustee in a continuous trust game. Under the consequential 
thinking condition, they were asked to estimate the amount of money 
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that their trustee would return to them, if they were to give them 
either $1 or $10 or $20, prior to making their actual decision. Under 
the control condition, they were simply asked to make their decision 
without being told to estimate what the trustee would return to them. 
To the two conditions of the study conducted by Kugler et al. (2009), 
a third (high cognitive influence condition) and a fourth (low cognitive 
influence condition) could be added. Under the high cognitive influence 
condition, the influence of System 2 would be enhanced by 
instructing the participants to thoroughly consider their decision 
prior to making it. Under the low cognitive influence condition, the 
influence of System 2 would be weakened by a cognitive load task. 
Past studies indicated that cognitive load diminishes the influence of 
System 2 while enhancing the influence of System 1 (Greene, Morelli, 
Loewenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). 
 The experiment should be replicated in a computer lab, in 
which participants would fill out all of the questions on a computer. 
All of the participants could be informed that they are taking part in 
an experiment examining the relationship between reaction time and 
decision making. Subsequently, participants would first be 
confronted with the continuous trust game paradigm, in which the 
trustor would be referred to as Person 1 and the trustee as Person 2. 
Hereafter, in order to measure reaction time, streams of digits would 
appear on the computer screen, and participants would be asked to 
press the space bar each time they came across the digit “5” within 
this stream. This reaction-time measure would actually be a cognitive 
load manipulation taken from a study conducted by Gilbert, Tafarodi, 
and Malone (1993). Subsequently, the computer would randomly 
assign the participants to one of four conditions.   
Under the consequential thinking condition, participants would 
be instructed to no longer pay attention to the digit stream. They 
would then be informed that they would now make a decision as 
Person 1 in the previously described situation and that they should 
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estimate the amount of money that Person 2 was likely to return to 
them, if they gave him or her either $1 or $10 or $20. 
Under the high cognitive influence condition, participants would 
be instructed to no longer pay attention to the digit stream. They 
would then be informed that they would now make a decision as 
Person 1 and that they should thoroughly think about their decision 
as to whether to keep or to hand over money. To ensure that 
participants follow this instruction, they would be informed that they 
would be required to wait at least 2 minutes before they would be 
able to indicate their choice on the computer.  
Under the low cognitive influence condition, participants would 
be instructed to continue searching for a “5” in the stream of digits 
and that they should now make a decision, taking on the role of 
Person 1. 
Under the control condition, participants would be instructed to 
no longer pay attention to the digit stream. They would then be 
informed that they would now make a decision in the previously 
described situation as Person 1. 
I predict that the findings of Kugler et al. (2009) would be 
replicated. Furthermore, I expect that under the consequential 
thinking condition and under the high cognitive influence condition, on 
average, trustors would give the trustee similarly low amounts. In 
addition, I expect that, on average, trustors under the low cognitive 
influence condition would send the highest amounts of money to the 
trustee.   
Study 2. If Study 1 demonstrated that not only consequential 
thinking but also the low cognitive influence condition and/or the 
high cognitive influence condition influence trust, I would attempt to 
replicate these findings in a binary trust game. Thus, Study 2 would 
be identical to Study 1, aside from two changes. First, participants 
would attend a binary trust game rather than a continuous one. 
Second, the consequential thinking condition would be eliminated.  
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I expect less trustors would hand over money under the high 
cognitive load condition than under the control condition and the low 
cognitive influence condition. Furthermore, I predict that the highest 
percentage of trustors would hand over money under the low 
cognitive influence condition. 
Study 3. If Study 2 demonstrated that the results of the 
continuous trust game are transferable to the binary trust game, I 
would attempt another manipulation of the influence of System 2 in a 
third study. Furthermore, I would examine whether people trust less 
when their System 2 is more active due to the fact that they are more 
influenced by rational considerations. 
Another possible means of manipulating the influence of 
System 2 is to manipulate people’s self-control capacity. Self-control 
can be defined as “the exertion of control over the self by the self” 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000, p. 247). It is related to resisting 
temptations, coping with stress and negative emotions, aggressive 
and criminal behavior, among other things (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000). Most interesting in relation to this study is the 
fact that self-control is required whenever people act in accordance 
with the rational considerations of System 2 that interfere with the 
impulsive motivations of System 1 (Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). 
Muraven and Baumeister assume that individuals possess different 
levels of self-control capacity. However, independent of basic levels of 
self-control capacity, a special feature of self-control is the fact that it 
is not an unlimited resource but is actually depleted when used 
(Baumeister et al., 1998). Consequently, when individuals must 
engage in an activity that requires self-control, they tend to have less 
self-control available for a subsequent task.  
If rational considerations and emotions have an antagonistic 
influence on trust, people with depleted self-control should have less 
willpower to resist their emotions. If it is assumed that emotions 
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influence people to trust and that rational considerations influence 
people to distrust, people with diminished willpower should trust 
more in a binary trust game than those with willpower that has not 
been exhausted.  
 In order to test my hypothesis, I suggest conducting a binary 
trust game, in which participants play the role of trustors under a 
depletion and under a no-depletion condition (between-subjects). In 
order to manipulate self-control, I suggest a design similar to the one 
utilized by Baumeister et al. (1998) in a study on self-control. 
Furthermore, in order to examine the effect of self-control more 
extensively, I suggest collecting self-control traits of all of the 
participants that attend the experiment at least two weeks in advance. 
As a trait measurement of self-control, researchers could use the 
scale developed by Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, and Arneklev (1993). 
Participants could be invited to single sessions in the lab and 
could be told that they will attend two independent studies. They 
would be informed that one of the studies would examine perceptions 
about food and that they should, therefore, not eat anything for at 
least 3 hours prior to the experiment. Upon arriving at the lab, the 
participants would be given a questionnaire that would describe a 
binary trust game, in which the trustor would be referred to as 
Person 1 and the trustee as Person 2. Participants would then be 
asked to estimate the percentage of individuals taking on the role of 
Person 2 (trustees) that would share money in this paradigm (that is 
to say, that would share received money). Subsequently, the 
questionnaire would close, and the participants would be instructed 
to ask the experimenter for the next questionnaire. As soon as the 
participants indicated that they had finished the questionnaire, the 
experimenter would explain to the participants that the other room 
for the food perception task was now free and that they would first 
participate in the food task and would continue with the decision 
task later. Subsequently, they would be put into a room with two 
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bowls on the table, one containing tasty chocolate chip cookies and 
chocolate candies and the other containing fresh radishes. 
Participants in the depletion condition would be told that both radish 
and chocolate were highly distinct foods and that they would have 
been assigned to the radish condition. Then they would be asked to 
eat at least three radishes within the next 5 minutes but would be 
told not consume any chocolate chip cookies or chocolate candies. 
The experimenter would leave the room and observe by means of a 
one-way mirror whether the participants resist eating any of the 
forbidden food. Baumeister et al. (1998) found that resisting tasty 
food depletes the self-control capacity of hungry people. After 5 
minutes, the experimenter would return and inform the participant 
that she or he would now need to wait 15 minutes for the sensory 
memory to fade, after which they would fill out a food perception 
questionnaire. Subsequently, participants would be asked to finish 
filling out the questionnaire for the first decision task during this 
break. After the trust game participants would be checked for 
suspicion in a funnel interview, paid and debriefed. The procedures 
in the no depletion condition would be identical to those of the 
depletion condition, except that participants would be asked to eat at 
least 3 pieces of chocolate chip cookies or chocolate candies.  
I expect that more trustors would hand over money under the 
depletion than the no-depletion condition. Furthermore, I expect that 
participants with lower self-control would be more willing to hand 
over money in the trust game. In addition, I expect that the estimated 
reliability of trustees would be a stronger predictor of trust behavior 
in the no-depletion than in the depletion condition. 
A manipulation of the involvement of System 2, as shown above, 
could also illuminate how the interplay of emotions and rational 
considerations influences trust decisions. There are different 
possibilities imaginable. First, it might be that a higher involvement 
of System 2 suppresses the influence of System 1 and by this the 
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influence of emotions. In other words, the emotions people have while 
deciding in a trust situation do not change but are overwritten by a 
strong influence of rational considerations. Second, it is also possible 
that a high involvement of System 2 does not diminish the influence 
of emotions on trust decisions but changes the emotions themselves. 
People’s decisions would be still strongly influenced by emotions but 
by different ones than in situations with less influence of System 2. A 
third possibility is that emotions are neither suppressed nor changed 
by a higher involvement of System 2 but that people adjust their 
trust decision more often according to anticipated rather than 
immediate emotions when System 2 is more strongly activated. 
 To illuminate the interplay of Systems 1 and 2 regarding trust 
decisions, further studies are imaginable similar to the suggested 
study, but extended by a measure of immediate and anticipated 
emotions. 
10.4. On the relationship of status and trust 
 In a recent study, Willer (2009) showed that status dynamics 
can solve the collective action problem. In particular, he revealed that 
high contributors to a public game earned higher status from group 
members as well as external observers because they were perceived 
as more motivated to help the group (generous and cooperative). 
Furthermore, Willer (2009) showed that participants who earned high 
status for their contributions to the group were in turn more group-
motivated and contributed more to the group in future interactions.  
 It seems plausible that status dynamics can influence trust 
behavior in a similar way. Collective action problems are social 
dilemmas like trust situations that involve strangers. In both 
situations all involved actors are better off if everybody cooperates, 
but incentives to defect can prevent this cooperative behavior (Kollock, 
1998). If status dynamics can make people contribute to a public 
good, maybe status dynamics can also make people trust strangers.  
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 Considering status in the context of trust is also interesting 
because researchers have argued that high-status people are more 
trusting since they have more resources than low-status people and 
can afford more trust (Smith, 1997; Uslaner, 2002). Extending this 
argument, I argue that high-status people might also trust more 
because they are more used to trust. High-status people usually have 
more social interactions than low-status people. Managers, 
politicians, or religious leaders, for example, have to trust all their 
subordinates. Furthermore, high-status people might have better 
experiences when they trust others than low-status people because 
high-status people have more power (Homans, 1961). Thus, it is more 
dangerous to behave in an untrustworthy way with a high-status 
person than with a low-status person.  
 Status dynamics could positively influence trust behavior in 
three ways. First, it is possible that high-status people trust more 
than those with low status, so trust behavior is associated with 
higher status. Perhaps people display trust in order to imitate high-
status people and achieve more status themselves. Second, trust 
could be seen as a costly signal for resources and thus for higher 
status. Third, trust behavior could be regarded as a pro-social, 
group-motivated behavior, and through this mechanism, people who 
trust gain higher status. To get further insight on this issue, I suggest 
several studies and provide details in the next section. 
10.4.1. Do high-status people trust more than low-status 
people? 
 First, an interesting question is whether high-status people 
trust more than low-status people. This question has already been 
partly considered by Hong and Bohnet (2007). In their study, they 
examined whether distrust of high- and low-status people is caused 
by different motivations. They distinguished two reasons for distrust. 
The first was inequality aversion, which is the trustor’s distaste for 
being worse off than the trustee when the trustee proves unreliable. 
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The second reason was betrayal aversion, which is the trustor’s 
dislike of being betrayed by the trustee. They found similar rates of 
trust among those in the different status groups but showed that 
those of higher status distrust because they are betrayal-averse, and 
low-status persons distrust because they are inequality-averse.  
 To measure risk attitudes, inequality aversion, and betrayal 
aversion, Hong and Bohnet (2007) applied paradigms similar to those 
found in Chapters 4 and 5 of this work. However, instead of placing 
participants into these paradigms, they confronted participants in all 
paradigms with a certain outcome and a game with two risky 
outcomes, one of which was higher than the certain outcome and the 
other one lower. Participants were then asked what their minimum 
accepted probability of receiving the higher outcome in the risky 
game is to take part in this game. For example, the study involved a 
trust game. However, instead of asking the participants whether they 
wanted to trust or distrust in this game, researchers asked 
participants for their minimum accepted probability of being matched 
with a trustworthy person to take part in the trust game. As 
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2010b) pointed out, such a design 
causes very different decisions than a design in which participants 
are placed into a trust situation and can only decide between trusting 
and distrusting. Therefore, it is possible that high- and low-status 
people demand similar high probabilities to be matched with a 
trustworthy participant when they are just asked for them. However, 
they might decide very differently when they have to choose between 
trust and distrust in an actual trust situation. 
 In order to find answers to this question, I suggest applying a 
binary trust game to examine the influence of status on the decision 
to trust. Apart from generalized status characteristics (see Ridway & 
Walker, 1995) like gender, race, age and education, the subjective 
social status of participants who attend this trust game could be 
measured. Subjective social status is ‘‘a person’s belief about his 
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location in a status order’’ (Davis, 1956, p. 154). Subjective social 
status can be measured by a 10-rung ladder self-report scale. 
Participants are told that this ladder represents society and asked to 
indicate on which rung they see themselves (Cantril, 1965).  
 I would expect that people with higher generalized status 
characteristics and a higher self-rated social status would be more 
willing to trust than people with a lower status. However, it could be 
that higher-status people can afford more risk. Thus, it would make 
sense to add a coin flip with similar pay-offs like the binary trust 
game to this experiment (between-subjects). I would not expect an 
influence of status on the decision to bet money in a coin flip, and if 
there is any, I would expect it to be a very weak one. 
10.4.2. Does trusting enhance status? 
 Second, it could be examined whether people use the display of 
trust to enhance their own status in a group. This can be true only if 
trustful people are regarded as having a higher status than 
distrustful people.  
 Thus, as a first step, it could be analyzed whether people 
attribute more status to trustful than to distrustful people. 
Participants could rate the status of people in vignettes who differ 
(between-subjects) in their trustfulness. According to Ridgeway and 
Erickson (2000), status could be operationalized by asking the 
participants how honorable, prestigious, and respected they perceive 
people in the vignettes to be.  
 In a second step, it could be investigated whether people who 
aspire to a higher status are more willing to trust in a binary trust 
game than people with a weak status aspiration. To measure status 
aspirations, the achievement aspiration scale developed by Cassidy 
and Lynn (1989) could be used. Again, the coin flip could be added to 
this experiment as a control for risk preferences. Furthermore, it 
would make sense to manipulate whether the trust game is 
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conducted under anonymity or in public to influence status 
incentives (see Chapter 10.2.1.). Therefore, I suggest a 2 (trust game 
vs. coin flip) x 2 (anonymous vs. public) x 2 (high status seekers vs. 
low status seekers) mixed-factorial design. The kind of game as well 
as whether the trust game would be conducted anonymously or in 
public would be between-subjects factors while all participants would 
need to fill out a questionnaire measuring their status aspirations 
(within-subjects). I would expect that those seeking a high status 
would hand over more money in the trust game than low status 
seekers. Furthermore, I would predict that this relationship is 
moderated by whether the trust game is conducted anonymously or 
in public. I would not expect an effect of status aspiration or the 
manipulation of anonymity on the risky decisions in the coin flip. 
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